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Abstract
The Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (hrc) is a generalisation of the
classical Hospitals / Resident problem (hr) that is important in practical applications
because it models the case where couples submit joint preference lists over pairs of (typ-
ically geographically close) hospitals. In this report we present new NP-completeness
results for the problem of deciding whether a stable matching exists, in highly restricted
instances of hrc. Further, we present an Integer Programming (IP) model for hrc and
extend it the case where preference lists can include ties. Also, we describe an empir-
ical study of an IP model for hrc and its extension to the case where preference lists
can include ties. This model was applied to randomly generated instances and also
real-world instances arising from previous matching runs of the Scottish Foundation
Allocation Scheme, used to allocate junior doctors to hospitals in Scotland.
1 Introduction
1.1 The Hospitals / Residents problem.
The Hospitals / Residents problem (hr) is a many-to-one allocation problem. An instance of
hr consists of two groups of agents – one containing hospitals and one containing residents.
Every hospital expresses a linear preference over some subset of the residents, its preference
list. The residents in a hospital’s preference list are its acceptable partners. Further, every
hospital has a capacity, cj , the maximum number of posts it has available to match with
residents. Every resident expresses a linear preference over some subset of the hospitals,
his acceptable hospitals.
The preferences expressed in this fashion are reciprocal: if a resident ri is acceptable
to a hospital hj , then hj is also acceptable to ri, and vice versa. A many-to-one matching
between residents and hospitals is sought, which is a set of acceptable resident-hospital pairs
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such that each resident appears in at most one pair and each hospital hj at most cj pairs.
If a resident ri appears in some pair of M , ri is said to be assigned in M and unassigned
otherwise. Any hospital assigned fewer residents than its capacity in some matching M is
under-subscribed in M .
A matching is stable if it admits no blocking pair. Following the definition used in [11],
a blocking pair consists of a mutually acceptable resident-hospital pair (r, h) such that both
of the following hold: (i) either r is unassigned, or r prefers h to his assigned hospital; (ii)
either h is under-subscribed in the matching, or h prefers r to at least one of its assigned
residents. Were such a pair to exist, they could form a private arrangement outside of the
matching, undermining its integrity [26].
It is known that every instance of hr admits at least one stable matching and such a
matching may be found in time linear in the size of the instance [11]. Also, for an arbitrary
hr instance I, any resident that is assigned in one stable matching in I is assigned in
all stable matchings in I, moreover any hospital that is under-subscribed in some stable
matching in I is assigned exactly the same set of residents in every stable matching in I
[12, 27, 26].
hr can be viewed as an abstract model of the matching process involved in a centralised
matching scheme such as the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) [32] through
which graduating medical students are assigned to hospital posts in the USA. A similar pro-
cess was used until recently to match medical graduates to Foundation Programme places
in Scotland, called the Scottish Foundation Allocation Scheme (SFAS) [14]. Analogous al-
location schemes having a similar underlying problem model exist around the world, both
in the medical sphere, e.g. in Canada [33], Japan [31], and beyond, e.g. in higher education
allocation in Hungary [5].
1.1.1 The Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples
Centralised matching schemes such as the NRMP and the SFAS have had to evolve to
accommodate couples who wish to be allocated to (geographically) compatible hospitals.
The requirement to take into account the joint preferences of couples has been in place in
the NRMP context since 1983 and since 2009 in the case of SFAS. In schemes where the
agents may be involved in couples, the underlying allocation problem can modelled by the
so-called Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (hrc).
As in the case of hr, an instance of hrc consists of a set of hospitals H and a set of
residents R. The residents in R are partitioned into two sets, S and S′. The set S consists
of single residents and the set S′ consists of those residents involved in couples. There is
a set C = {(ri, rj) : ri, rj ∈ S′} of couples such that each resident in S′ belongs to exactly
one pair in C.
Each single resident ri ∈ S expresses a linear preference order over his acceptable
hospitals. Each pair of residents (ri, rj) ∈ C expresses a joint linear preference order over a
subset A of H ×H where (hp, hq) ∈ A represents the joint assignment of ri to hp and rj to
hq. The hospital pairs in A represent those joint assignments that are acceptable to (ri, rj),
all other joint assignments being unacceptable to (ri, rj).
Each hospital hj ∈ H expresses a linear preference order over those residents who find
hj acceptable, either as a single resident or as part of a couple. As in the hr case, each
hospital hj ∈ H has a capacity, cj .
A many-to-one matching between residents and hospitals is sought, which is defined as
for hr with the additional restriction that each couple (ri, rj) is either jointly unassigned,
meaning that both ri and rj are unassigned, or jointly assigned to some pair (hk, hl) that
(ri, rj) find acceptable.As in hr, we seek a stable matching, which guarantees that no
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resident and hospital, and no couple and pair of hospitals, have an incentive to deviate
from their assignments and become assigned to each other.
Roth [26] considered stability in the hrc context although did not define the concept
explicitly. Whilst Gusfield and Irving [13] defined stability in hrc, their definition neglected
to deal with the case that both members of a couple may wish to be assigned to the same
hospital. Manlove and McDermid [20] extended their definition to deal with this possibility.
Henceforth, we refer to Manlove and McDermid’s stability definition as MM-stability. We
now define this concept formally.
Definition 1. A matching M is MM-stable if none of the following holds:
1. The matching is blocked by a hospital hj and a single resident ri, as in the classical
HR problem.
2. The matching is blocked by a couple (ri, rj) and a hospital hk such that either
(a) (ri, rj) prefers (hk,M(rj)) to (M(ri),M(rj)), and hk is either under-subscribed
in M or prefers ri to some member of M(hk)\{rj} or
(b) (ri, rj) prefers (M(ri), hk) to (M(ri),M(rj)), and hk is either under-subscribed
in M or prefers rj to some member of M(hk)\{ri}
3. The matching is blocked by a couple (ri, rj) and (not necessarily distinct) hospitals
hk 6= M(ri), hl 6= M(rj); that is, (ri, rj) prefers the joint assignment (hk, hl) to
(M(ri),M(rj)), and either
(a) hk 6= hl, and hk (respectively hl) is either under-subscribed in M or prefers ri
(respectively rj) to at least one of its assigned residents in M ; or
(b) hk = hl, and hk has at least two free posts in M , i.e., ck − |M(hk)|≥ 2; or
(c) hk = hl, and hk has one free post in M , i.e., ck − |M(hk)|= 1, and hk prefers at
least one of ri, rj to some member of M(hk); or
(d) hk = hl, hk is full in M , hk prefers ri to some rs ∈M(hk), and hk prefers rj to
some rt ∈M(hk)\{rs}.
The majority of the results in this paper for hrc are given in terms of MM-stability. A
further stability definition due to Biro´ et al [6] (henceforth BIS-stability) can be applied in
contexts where the hospitals rank the residents according to an agreed criterion, such as in
the SFAS context where this criterion is represented by a score derived for each resident
from their academic performance and their completed application. The rationale behind
the BIS stability definition being that in a stable matching M , if a resident r is not matched
to a hospital h then all of the residents who are matched to h in M are strictly preferable
to r under the applied criterion. We now define BIS-stability formally as follows.
Definition 2. A matching M is BIS-stable if none of the following holds:
1. The matching is blocked by a hospital hj and a single resident ri, as in the classical
HR problem.
2. The matching is blocked by a hospital hk and a resident ri who is coupled, say with
rj; that is either
(a) (ri, rj) prefers (hk,M(rj)) to (M(ri),M(rj)) and either
(i) hk 6= M(rj) and hk is either under-subscribed in M or prefers ri to some
member of M(hk) or
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(ii) hk = M(rj) and hk is either under-subscribed in M or prefers both ri and
rj to some member of M(hk) \ {rj}
(b) (ri, rj) prefers (M(ri), hk) to (M(ri),M(rj)) and either (i) or (ii) as above
adapted to symmetric case
3. The matching is blocked by a couple (ri, rj) and (not necessarily distinct) hospitals
hk 6= M(ri) and hl 6= M(rj); that is, (ri, rj) prefers the joint assignment (hk, hl) to
(M(ri),M(rj)), and either
(a) hk 6= hl, and hk (respectively hl) is either under-subscribed in M or prefers ri
(respectively rj) to at least one of its assignees in M ; or
(b) hk = hl, and hk has at least two free posts in M or
(c) hk = hl, and hk has one free post in M and both ri and rj are preferred by hk
to some member of M(hk) and
(d) hk = hl, hk is full in M and either
(i) hk prefers each of ri and rj to some rp ∈M(hk) who is a member of a couple
with some rq ∈M(hk),
(ii) the least preferred resident among ri and rj (according to hk) is preferred by
hk to two members of M(hk)
It is notable that, for an arbitrary instance I of hrc in which hospitals may have a
capacity greater than 1, an MM-stable matching need not be BIS-stable and vice versa.
The instances described in Section 5 demonstrate this unequivocally. In the restriction of
hrc in which each hospitals has a capacity of 1, BIS-stability and MM-stability are both
equivalent to the stability definition from Gusfield and Irving [13] since no couple (ri, rj)
may express a preference for a hospital pair (hk, hk).
The Hospitals / Residents Problem with Couples and Ties (hrct) is a generalisation of
hrc in which hospitals (respectively residents) may find some subsets of their acceptable
residents (respectively hospitals) equally preferable. Residents (respectively hospitals) that
are found equally preferable by a hospital (respectively resident) are tied with each other
in the preference list of that hospital (respectively resident). The stability definitions in
Definition 1 and Definition 2 remain unchanged in the hrct context.
1.2 Existing algorithmic results for hrc.
In contrast with hr, an instance of hrc need not admit a stable matching [26]. Also an
instance of hrc may admit stable matchings of differing sizes [2]. Further, the problem of
deciding whether a stable matching exists in an instance of hrc is NP-complete, even in
the restricted case where there are no single residents and all of the hospitals have only one
available post [25, 22].
In many practical applications of hrc the residents’ preference lists are short. Let (α, β)-
hrc denote the restriction of hrc in which each single resident’s preference list contains at
most α hospitals, each couple’s preference list contains at most α pairs of hospitals and each
hospital’s preference list contains at most β residents. (α, β)-hrc is hard even for small
values of α and β: Manlove and McDermid [20] showed that (3, 6)-hrc is NP-complete.
A further restriction of hrc is hrc-dual-market, defined as follows. Given an instance
I of hrc, let the set of all first members of each couple in I be R1 ⊆ R, and the set of
second members of each couple in I be R2 ⊆ R. Let the set of acceptable partners of the
residents in R1 in I be H1 ⊆ H and the set of acceptable partners of the residents in R2 in
I be H2 ⊆ H. If in I, H1 ∩H2 = ∅ and no single resident has acceptable partners in both
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H1 and H2 then we define I to be an instance of hrc-dual-market consisting of the two
disjoint markets R1 ∪ H1 and R2 ∪ H2. The problem of deciding whether an instance of
hrc-dual-market admits a stable matching is also known to be NP-complete [21] even if
the instance contains no single residents and the hospitals all have capacity one.
Since the existence of an efficient algorithm for finding a stable matching, or reporting
that none exists, in an instance of hrc is unlikely, in practical applications such as SFAS
and NRMP, stable matchings are found by applying heuristics [6, 28]. However, neither
the SFAS heuristic, nor the NRMP heuristic guarantee to terminate and output a stable
matching, even in instances where a stable matching does exist. Hence, a method which
guarantees to find a maximum cardinality stable matching in an arbitrary instance of hrc,
where one exists, might be of considerable interest. For further results on hrc the reader
is referred to [7] and [18].
For further results in hrc the reader is referred to [7] and [18].
1.3 Linear Programming, Integer Programming and Constraint Program-
ming techniques applied to hr and its variants
Vande Vate [30] described a Linear Programming (LP) formulation for the Stable Marriage
problem, the one-to-one variant of hr in which all hospitals have a capacity of 1, the
numbers of residents and hospitals are the same, and each of the residents finds every
hospital acceptable. Rothblum [29] generalised this model to the hr context for arbitrary
instances. Ba¨ıou and Balinski [3] formulated an LP model for hr which Fleiner [10] further
generalised to the many-to-many version of hr, a variant in which both hospitals and
residents may have capacities exceeding one.
Podhradsky [24] empirically investigated the performance of approximation algorithms
for max-smti (the 1-1 restriction of max-hrt, the NP-hard problem of finding a maximum
cardinality stable matching given an instance of hrt) and compared them against one an-
other and against an IP formulation for max-smti. Kwanashie and Manlove [17] described
an Integer Programming (IP) model for the Hospitals Residents problem with Ties (hrt).
Manlove et al. [19] and Eirinakis et al [8] applied Constraint Programming (CP) tech-
niques to hr while O’Malley [23] described a CP formulation for hrt. Subsequently, Eiri-
nakis et al [9] gave a generalised CP formulation for many-to-many hr. The reader is
referred to Ref. [18, Sections 2.4 & 2.5] for more information about previous work involving
the application of IP and CP techniques applied to allocation problems such as hr.
1.4 Contribution of this work
In Section 2 of this paper we present a collection of new hardness results for hrc. We begin
in Section 2.2.1 by presenting a new NP-completeness result for the problem of deciding
whether there exists a stable matching in an instance of (2, 2)-hrc where there are no
single residents and all hospitals have capacity 1. This is the most restricted case of hrc
currently known for which NP-completeness holds. A natural way to try to cope with this
complexity is to approximate a matching that is ‘as stable as possible’, i.e., admits the
minimum number of blocking pairs [1]. Let min-bp-hrc denote the problem of finding a
matching with the minimum number of blocking pairs, given an instance of hrc, and let
(α, β)-min-bp-hrc denote the restriction to instances of (α, β)-hrc. In Section 2.2.2 we
prove that (2, 2)-min-bp-hrc is not approximable within N1−ε, where N is the number of
residents in a given instance, for any ε > 0, unless P=NP.
In Section 2.3 we show that (2, 3)-hrc is also NP-complete even when all of the hospitals
have capacity 1 and there are no single residents and the preference list of each couple and
hospital are derived from a strictly ordered master list of pairs of hospitals and residents
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respectively. Further, in Section 2.4 we show that deciding whether an instance of (3, 3)-
hrc-dual-market (which is an instance of hrc-dual-market in which the residents’,
couples’ and hospitals’ preference lists have a maximum length of three) admits a stable
matching, is NP-complete even when all hospitals have capacity 1 and the preference lists
of all residents, couples and hospitals are derived from a master list of hospitals, hospital
pairs and residents respectively.
Further in Section 3.2 we present a description of the first IP model for finding a max-
imum cardinality stable matching or reporting that none exists in an arbitrary instance of
hrc. Then in Section 4 we present experimental results obtained from a Java implementa-
tion of the IP model for hrc applied to randomly generated instances of hrc constructed
in a manner consistent with the SFAS format. We further extend this model to find a
maximum cardinality stable matching in the more general hrct context and apply it to
real-world instances arising from previous matching runs of SFAS, the allocation scheme
previously used to allocate junior doctors to hospitals in Scotland.
Section 5 of the report presents a cloning methodology for hrc which can be used to
construct an instance of one-to-one hrc from an instance of many-to-one hrc where the
MM-stable matchings in the many-to-one instance are in correspondence to the MM-stable
matchings in the one-to-one instance. Finally, in Section 6 we present some conclusions
based on the work presented.
2 Complexity Results for hrc
2.1 Introduction
In this section we present hardness results for finding and approximating stable matchings
in instances of hrc. We begin in Section 2.2.1 by establishing NP-completness for the
problem of deciding whether a stable matching exists in a highly restricted instance of hrc.
We then turn to min-bp-hrc in Section 2.2.2. Clearly Theorem 1 in Section 2.2.1 implies
that this problem is NP-hard. By chaining together instances of (2, 2)-hrc constructed in
the proof of Theorem 1, we arrive at a gap-introducing reduction which establishes a strong
inapproximability result for min-bp-hrc under the same restrictions as in Theorem 1 in
Section 2.2.1.
Using a similar reduction to the one used to show NP-completeness in instances of (2, 2)-
hrc, in Section 2.3 we show that, given an instance of (2, 3)-hrc, the problem of deciding
whether the instance admits a stable matching is NP-complete even under the restriction
that all of the hospitals have capacity 1, there are no single residents and the preference
lists for all of the single residents, couples and hospitals are derived from a master list of
hospitals, hospital pairs and residents respectively.
Finally in Section 2.4 we show that, given an instance of (3, 3)-hrc-dual-market, the
problem of deciding whether there exists a stable matching is NP-complete. Again, we show
that the result holds under the restriction that the hospitals have capacity 1 and that the
result also holds under the further restriction that the preference lists for all of the single
residents, couples and hospitals are derived from a master list of hospitals, hospital pairs
and residents respectively.
2.2 Complexity results for (2, 2)-hrc
2.2.1 NP-completeness result for (2, 2)-hrc
Theorem 1. Given an instance of (2, 2)-hrc, the problem of deciding whether there exists
a stable matching is NP-complete. The result holds even if there are no single residents and
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each hospital has capacity 1.
Proof. The proof of this result uses a reduction from a restricted version of sat. More
specifically, let (2,2)-e3-sat denote the problem of deciding, given a Boolean formula B in
CNF over a set of variables V , whether B is satisfiable, where B has the following properties:
(i) each clause contains exactly 3 literals and (ii) for each vi ∈ V , each of literals vi and v¯i
appears exactly twice in B. Berman et al. [4] showed that (2,2)-e3-sat is NP-complete.
The problem (2, 2)-hrc is clearly in NP, as a given assignment may be verified to be a
stable matching in polynomial time. To show NP-hardness, let B be an instance of (2,2)-e3-
sat. Let V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} and C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} be the set of variables and clauses
respectively in B. Then for each vi ∈ V , each of literals vi and v¯i appears exactly twice in
B. Also |cj |= 3 for each cj ∈ C. (Hence m = 4n3 .) We form an instance I of (2, 2)-hrc as
follows.
The set of residents in I is A ∪ B ∪X ∪ Y where A = ⋃ni=1Ai, Ai = {ari : 1 ≤ r ≤ 2}
(1 ≤ i ≤ n), B = ⋃ni=1Bi, Bi = {bri : 1 ≤ r ≤ 2} (1 ≤ i ≤ n), X = ⋃mj=1Xj , Xj = {xsj : 1 ≤
s ≤ 3} (1 ≤ j ≤ m) and Y = ⋃mj=1 Yj , Yj = {ysj : 1 ≤ s ≤ 3} (1 ≤ j ≤ m). There are no
single residents in I and the pairing of the residents into couples is as shown in Figure 1.
The set of hospitals in I is H∪T , where H = ⋃ni=1Hi, Hi = {hri : 1 ≤ r ≤ 6} (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
and T =
⋃m
j=1 Tj , Tj = {trj : 1 ≤ r ≤ 6} (1 ≤ j ≤ m) and each hospital has capacity 1. The
preference lists of the resident couples and hospitals in I are shown in Figure 1.
In the joint preference list of a couple (xsj , y
s
j ) (1 ≤ j ≤ m, 1 ≤ s ≤ 3) the symbol h(xsj)
is defined as follows. If the rth occurrence (1 ≤ r ≤ 2) of literal vi occurs at position s of
cj then h(x
s
j) = h
2r+1
i . If the r
th occurrence (1 ≤ r ≤ 2) of literal v¯i occurs at position s of
cj then h(x
s
j) = h
2r+2
i .
In the preference list of a hospital h2r+1i (1 ≤ r ≤ 2), the symbol x(h2r+1i ) denotes
the resident xsj such that the r
th occurrence of literal vi occurs at position s of clause cj .
Similarly in the preference list of a hospital h2r+2i (1 ≤ r ≤ 2), the symbol x(h2r+2i ) denotes
the resident xsj such that the r
th occurrence of literal v¯i occurs at position s of clause cj .
For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), let Ti = {(a1i , h2i ), (a2i , h1i ), (b1i , h4i ), (b2i , h6i ), (x(h3i ), h3i ), (x(h5i ), h5i )}
and Fi = {(a1i , h1i ), (a2i , h2i ), (b1i , h3i ), (b2i , h5i ), (x(h4i ), h4i ), (x(h6i ), h6i )}.
We claim that B is satisfiable if and only if I admits a stable matching.
Let f be a satisfying truth assignment of B. Define a matching M in I as follows. For
each variable vi ∈ V , if vi is true under f , add the pairs in Ti to M , otherwise add the pairs
in Fi to M . Let j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) be given. Then cj contains at least one literal that is true
under f . Suppose cj contains exactly one literal that is true under f . Let s be the position
of cj containing a true literal. In this case add the pairs {(xs+1j , ts+1j ), (ys+1j , tsj)} (where
addition is taken modulo three) to M . Now suppose cj contains exactly two literals that
are true under f . Let s be the position of cj containing a false literal, and add the pairs
{(xsj , tsj), (ysj , ts+2j )} (where addition is taken modulo three) to M . If cj contains 3 literals
which are true under f no additional pairs need be added.
No resident pair (a1i , b
1
i ) or (a
2
i , b
2
i ) may be involved in a blocking pair of M , as no
matching in which (a1i , b
1
i ) is matched with (h
2
i , h
4
i ) is blocked by (a
1
i , b
1
i ) with (h
1
i , h
3
i ), and
equally no matching in which (a2i , b
2
i ) is matched with (h
1
i , h
6
i ) is blocked by (a
2
i , b
2
i ) with
(h2i , h
5
i ).
No resident pair (xsj , y
s
j ) (1 ≤ s ≤ 3) may block M with (h(xsj), ts+3j ) (where addition is
taken modulo three). To prove this observe that all hri are matched in M and hence if some
hri is not matched to its corresponding x(h
r
i ) then h
r
i must be matched to the member of
Bi in first place on its preference list. Thus (x
s
j , y
s
j ) may not block M with (h(x
s
j), t
s+3
j ).
No resident pair (xsj , y
s
j ) (1 ≤ s ≤ 3) may be involved in a blocking pair of M with
(tsj , t
s+2
j ) (where addition is taken modulo three). Clearly (x
s
j , y
s
j ) may only block M with
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(a1i , b
1
i ) : (h
1
i , h
3
i ) (h
2
i , h
4
i ) (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
(a2i , b
2
i ) : (h
2
i , h
5
i ) (h
1
i , h
6
i ) (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
(x1j , y
1
j ) : (h(x
1
j ), t
4
j ) (t
1
j , t
3
j ) (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
(x2j , y
2
j ) : (h(x
2
j ), t
5
j ) (t
2
j , t
1
j ) (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
(x3j , y
3
j ) : (h(x
3
j ), t
6
j ) (t
3
j , t
2
j ) (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
h1i : a
2
i a
1
i (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
h2i : a
1
i a
2
i (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
h3i : b
1
i x(h
3
i ) (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
h4i : b
1
i x(h
4
i ) (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
h5i : b
2
i x(h
5
i ) (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
h6i : b
2
i x(h
6
i ) (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
t1j : x
1
j y
2
j (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
t2j : x
2
j y
3
j (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
t3j : x
3
j y
1
j (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
t4j : y
1
j (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
t5j : y
2
j (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
t6j : y
3
j (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
Figure 1: Preference lists in I, the constructed instance of (2, 2)-hrc.
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(a, b) : (z1, z2)
c : z1 z2
z1 : a c
z2 : c b
Figure 2: A small instance of (2, 2)-hrc which admits no stable matching.
(tsj , t
s+2
j ) if (x
s
j , y
s
j ) is unmatched in M . From the construction, this may only be the case
if cj contains exactly one literal that is true under f . In this case, (x
s+2
j , y
s+2
j ) is matched
with (ts+2j , t
s+4
j ) (where addition is taken modulo 3) and thus (x
s
j , y
s
j ) (1 ≤ s ≤ 3) may not
block M with (tsj , t
s+2
j ), since t
s+2
j prefers x
s+2
j to y
s
j .
Hence M is a stable matching in I. Conversely suppose that M is a stable matching in
I. We form a truth assignment f in B as follows.
For any i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), if (a1i , b1i ) is unmatched then M is blocked by (a1i , b1i ) with (h2i , h4i ).
Similarly, if (a2i , b
2
i ) is unmatched then M is blocked by (a
2
i , b
2
i ) with (h
1
i , h
6
i ). Hence either
{(a1i , h2i ), (b1i , h4i ), (a2i , h1i ), (b2i , h6i )} ⊆M or {(a1i , h1i ), (b1i , h3i ), (a2i , h2i ), (b2i , h5i )} ⊆M .
Now let cj be a clause in C (1 ≤ j ≤ m). Suppose, (xsj , h(xsj)) /∈M for all s (1 ≤ s ≤ 3).
Clearly, at most one couple (xsj , y
s
j ) may be matched to the hospital pair in second place on
its preference list. Since no (xsj , y
s
j ) is matched to the pair in first place in its preference list
one of the remaining two unmatched (xsj , y
s
j )’s must block with the hospital pair in second
place on its preference list, a contradiction. Thus {(xsj , h(xsj)), (ysj , ts+3j ))} ⊆ M for some
s (1 ≤ s ≤ 3) by the stability of M
Hence, for each j (1 ≤ j ≤ m), let s (1 ≤ s ≤ 3) be such that (xsj , ysj ) is matched with
(h(xsj), t
s+3
j ). Let h
r
i = h(x
s
j). If r ∈ {3, 5} then we set f(vi) = T . Thus, variable vi is true
under f and hence clause cj is true under f since the literal vi occurs in cj . Otherwise,
r ∈ {4, 6} and we set f(vi) = F . Thus, variable vi is false under f and hence clause cj is
true under f since the literal v¯i occurs in cj .
This assignment of truth values is well-defined, for if (hri , t
s+3
j ) ∈ M for r ∈ {3, 5}
then {(b1i , h4i ), (b2i , h6i )} ⊆M , so neither h4i nor h6i is partnered with a member of X in M .
Similarly if (hri , t
s+3
j ) ∈M for r ∈ {4, 6} then {(b1i , h3i ), (b2i , h5i )} ⊆M , so neither h3i nor h5i
is partnered with a member of X in M . Hence f is a satisfying truth assignment of B.
2.2.2 Inapproximability of (2, 2)-min-bp-hrc
Let A be an instance of (2, 2)-hrc as shown in Figure 2. In A the residents are a, b and c,
the hospitals are z1 and z2 and each hospital has a capacity of 1. The instance S admits
three non-empty matchings, namely
M1 = {(a, z1), (b, z2)}
M2 = {(c, z1)}
M3 = {(c, z2)}
Clearly, none of the matchings is stable. Further each of the non-empty matchings in A
is blocked by precisely one blocking pair. M1 is blocked in A by only (c, z2), M2 is blocked in
A by only ((a, b), (z1, z2)) and M3 is blocked in A by only (c, z1). Thus, A admits no stable
matching but amongst all of the non-empty matchings admitted by A, the only number
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of blocking pairs possible (and thus the minimum) is 1. We shall use this property of the
instance A in the proofs that follow. The following theorem allows us to prove that, unless
P=NP, there is a limit on the approximability of min-bp-hrc in a highly restricted case.
Theorem 2. min-bp-hrc is not approximable within n1−ε1 , where n1 is the number of
residents in a given instance, for any ε > 0 unless P=NP even if there are no single
residents and the resident couples and hospitals have preference lists of length ≤ 2.
Proof. Let B be an instance of (2,2)-e3-sat and let I be the corresponding instance of
(2, 2)-hrc as constructed in Theorem 1. We show how to modify I in order to obtain an
extended instance I ′′ of (2, 2)-hrc as follows.
Choose c = d2/εe and k = nc. Now, let I1, I2, . . . , Ik be k disjoint copies of the in-
stance I. Let I ′ be the (2, 2)-hrc instance formed by taking the union of the sub-instances
I1, I2, . . . , Ik. Let I
′′ be the instance constructed by adding the instance A of (2, 2)-hrc
described in Figure 2 to I ′.
If B admits a satisfying truth assignment then by Theorem 1, I admits a stable matching
and clearly each copy of I must also admit a stable matching. Thus I ′ must admit a stable
matching. Moreover, since any non-empty matching admitted by A has exactly one blocking
pair, a matching exists in I ′′ which has exactly one blocking pair.
If B admits no satisfying truth assignment, then by Theorem 1, I admits no stable
matching. We claim that any matching admitted by I ′′ must be blocked by k + 1 or more
blocking pairs. Since I admits no stable matching, any matching in I must have at least
one blocking pair. Thus each Ir (1 ≤ r ≤ k) admits only matchings with one or more
blocking pair. Since the only non-empty matchings admitted by A have a single blocking
pair, any matching admitted by I ′′ must have at least k + 1 blocking pairs.
The number of residents in I ′′ is n1 = 4nk + 6mk + 3. From the construction of I in
Theorem 1 we know that 4n = 3m and thus n1 ≤ 12nk + 3. We lose no generality by
assuming that n ≥ 3. Thus n1 ≤ 13nk = 13nc+1.
Moreover,
13−c/(c+1)nc/(c+1)1 ≤ k. (1)
Now we know that n1 ≥ k = nc. We lose no generality by assuming that n ≥ 13 and
hence n1 ≥ 13c. It follows that
n
−1/(c+1)
1 ≤ 13−c/(c+1). (2)
Thus it follows from Inequality 1 and 2 that
n
c−1/c+1
1 = n
c/(c+1)
1 n
−1/(c+1)
1 ≤ 13−c/(c+1)nc/(c+1)1 ≤ k (3)
We now show that n1−ε1 ≤ nc−1/c+11 . Observe that c ≥ 2/ε and thus c+ 1 ≥ 2/ε. Hence
1− ε ≤ c+ 1− 2
c+ 1
=
c− 1
c+ 1
and hence by Inequality 3, n1−ε1 ≤ k.
Assume that X is an approximation algorithm for (2, 2)-hrc with a performance guar-
antee of n1−ε1 ≤ k. Let B be an instance of (2,2)-e3-sat and construct an instance I ′′ of
(2, 2)-hrc from B as described above. If B admits a satisfying truth assignment then X
must return a matching in I ′′ which admits ≤ k blocking pairs. Otherwise, B does not ad-
mit a satisfying assignment and X must return a matching which admits ≥ k + 1 blocking
pairs. Thus algorithm X may be used to determine whether B admits a satisfying truth
assignment in polynomial time, a contradiction. Hence, no such polynomial approximation
algorithm can exist unless P = NP .
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2.3 Complexity results for (2, 3)-hrc with master lists
Theorem 3. Given an instance of (2, 3)-hrc, the problem of deciding whether the instance
supports a stable matching is NP-complete. The result holds even if there are no single
residents and each hospital has capacity 1.
Proof. The proof of this result uses a reduction from a restricted version of sat. More
specifically, let (2,2)-e3-sat denote the problem of deciding, given a Boolean formula B in
CNF over a set of variables V , whether B is satisfiable, where B has the following properties:
(i) each clause contains exactly 3 literals and (ii) for each vi ∈ V , each of literals vi and v¯i
appears exactly twice in B. Berman et al. [4] showed that (2,2)-e3-sat is NP-complete.
The problem (2, 3)-hrc is clearly in NP, as a given assignment may be verified to be a
stable matching in polynomial time.
To show NP-hardness, let B be an instance of (2,2)-e3-sat. Let V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}
and C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} be the set of variables and clauses respectively in B. Then for
each vi ∈ V , each of literals vi and v¯i appears exactly twice in B. Also |cj |= 3 for each
cj ∈ C. (Hence m = 4n3 .) We form an instance I of (2, 3)-hrc as follows.
The set of residents in I is X ∪ P ∪Q, where X = ⋃ni=1Xi, Xi = {xri , x¯ri : 1 ≤ r ≤ 2}
(1 ≤ i ≤ n), P = ⋃mj=1 Pj , Pj = {psj : 1 ≤ s ≤ 3} (1 ≤ j ≤ m), Q = ⋃mj=1Qj ,
Qj = {qsj : 1 ≤ s ≤ 3} (1 ≤ j ≤ m).
There are no single residents in I and the pairing of the residents into couples is as
shown in Figure 3.
The set of hospitals in I is H∪Y , where H = ⋃ni=1Hi, Hi = {hri : 1 ≤ r ≤ 2} (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
and Y = {ysj : 1 ≤ s ≤ 3} (1 ≤ j ≤ m) and each hospital has capacity 1. The preference
lists of the resident couples and hospitals in I are shown in Figure 3.
In the joint preference list of a couple (x1i , x
2
i ) (x
1
i ∈ X,x2i ∈ X) the symbol y(xri )
(1 ≤ r ≤ 2) denotes the hospital ysj ∈ Y such that the rth occurrence of literal vi appears
at position s of clause cj in B.
Similarly in the joint preference list of a couple (x¯1i , x¯
2
i ) (x¯
1
i ∈ X, x¯2i ∈ X) the symbol
y(x¯ri ) (1 ≤ r ≤ 2) denotes the hospital ysj ∈ Y such that the rth occurrence of literal v¯i
appears at position s of clause cj in B.
Also in the preference list of a hospital ysj ∈ Y , if literal vi (respectively v¯i) appears at
position s of clause cj ∈ C, the symbol x(ysj ) denotes the resident x1i or x2i (respectively x¯1i
or x¯2i ) according as this is the first or second occurrence of the literal in B.
For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), let Ti = {(x1i , y(x1i )), (x2i , y(x2i )), (x¯1i , h1i ), (x¯2i , h2i )} and Fi =
{(x1i , h1i ), (x2i , h2i ), (x¯1i , y(x¯1i ), (x¯2i , y(x¯2i )}.
We claim that B is satisfiable if and only if I admits a stable matching.
Let f be a satisfying truth assignment of B. Define a matching M in I as follows. For
each variable vi ∈ V , if vi is true under f , add the pairs in Ti to M , otherwise add the pairs
in Fi to M .
Let j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) be given. Then cj contains at least one literal that is true under f .
Suppose this literal occurs at position s of cj (1 ≤ s ≤ 3), then (x(ysj ), ysj ) ∈M . If no other
literal in cj is true then add the pairs {(ps+1j , ys+1j ), (qs+1j , ys+2j )} to M (where addition is
taken modulo 3).
No resident pair (x1i , x
2
i ) or (x¯
1
i , x¯
2
i ) may block M , as no matching in which (x
1
i , x
2
i ) is
matched with (h1i , h
2
i ) is blocked by (x¯
1
i , x¯
2
i ) with (h
1
i , h
2
i ), and equally no matching in which
(x¯1i , x¯
2
i ) is matched with (h
1
i , h
2
i ) is blocked by (x
1
i , x
2
i ) with (h
1
i , h
2
i ).
No resident pair (psj , q
s
j ) may block M as, if (p
s
j , q
s
j ) is not matched to (y
s
j , y
s+1
j ) (where
addition is taken modulo 3), then at least one of ysj or y
s+1
j is matched to its first choice
and therefore (psj , q
s
j ) may not block M with (y
s
j , y
s+1
j ).
Hence M is a stable matching in I.
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(x1i , x
2
i ) : (h
1
i , h
2
i ) (y(x
1
i ), y(x
2
i )) (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
(x¯1i , x¯
2
i ) : (h
1
i , h
2
i ) (y(x¯
1
i ), y(x¯
2
i )) (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
(p1j , q
1
j ) : (y
1
j , y
2
j ) (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
(p2j , q
2
j ) : (y
2
j , y
3
j ) (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
(p3j , q
3
j ) : (y
3
j , y
1
j ) (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
h1i : x
1
i x¯
1
i (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
h2i : x¯
2
i x
2
i (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
y1j : x(y
1
j ) p
1
j q
3
j (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
y2j : x(y
2
j ) p
2
j q
1
j (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
y3j : x(y
3
j ) p
3
j q
2
j (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
Figure 3: Preference lists in I, the constructed instance of (2, 3)-hrc.
Conversely suppose that M is a stable matching in I. We form a truth assignment f in
B as follows.
For any i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), if h1i and h2i are unmatched then M is blocked by (x1i , x2i )
with (h1i , h
2
i ). Hence either {(x1i , h1i ), (x2i , h2i )} ⊆ M or {(x¯1i , h1i ), (x¯2i , h2i )} ⊆ M . Suppose
(x1i , x
2
i ) are unmatched. Then (x
1
i , x
2
i ) blocks with (y(x
1
i ), y(x
2
i )). Similarly (x¯
1
i , x¯
2
i ) must
be matched. Hence M ∩ (Xi × (H ∪ Y )) = Ti or M ∩ (Xi × (H ∪ Y )) = Fi. In the former
case set f(xi) = Ti and in the latter case set f(xi) = Fi.
Now let cj be a clause in C (1 ≤ j ≤ m). Suppose (x(ysj ), ysj ) /∈M for all s (1 ≤ s ≤ 3).
If (p1j , q
1
j ) is matched to (y
1
j , y
2
j ) then (p
2
j , q
2
j ) blocks with (y
2
j , y
3
j ). If (p
2
j , q
2
j ) is matched to
(y2j , y
3
j ) then (p
3
j , q
3
j ) blocks M with (y
3
j , y
1
j ). If (p
3
j , q
3
j ) is matched to (y
3
j , y
1
j ) then (p
1
j , q
1
j )
blocks M with (y1j , y
2
j ). If {(psj , ysj ), (qs, yj ,s+1 )} 6⊆ M for 1 ≤ s leq3 (where addition is
taken modulo 3) then (p1j , q
1
j ) blocks M with (y
1
j , y
2
j ). Therefore (x(y
s
j ), y
s
j ) ∈ M for some
s (1 ≤ s ≤ 3) by the stability of M .
If x(ysj ) = x
r
i then (x
r
i , y
s
j ) ∈ Ti and therefore vi is true under f and hence cj is true
under f . Otherwise x(ysj ) = x¯
r
i , so (x¯
r
i , y
s
j ) ∈ Fi and v¯i is false under f and hence cj is true
under f .
Hence f is a satisfying truth assignment of B.
Corollary 4. Given an instance of (2, 3)-hrc, the problem of deciding whether a stable
matching exists is NP-complete. The result holds even in the case where there are no single
residents, each hospital has capacity 1 and the preference list of each couple and hospital are
derived from a strictly ordered master list of pairs of hospitals and residents respectively.
Proof. Consider the instance I of (2, 3)-hrc as constructed in the proof of Theorem 3, and
let n and m be defined as in the proof of Theorem 3. The master lists shown in Figures 4
and 5 indicate that the preference list of each resident couple and hospital may be derived
from a master list of hospital pairs and residents respectively. Since there are no single
residents in I, no preferences are expressed for individual hospitals in I.
As we have previously shown that (2,2)-e3-sat may be reduced to the instance I in
polynomial time, the corollary has been proven.
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L1i : (h
1
i , h
2
i ) (y(x
1
i ), y(x
2
i )) (y(x¯
1
i ), y(x¯
2
i )) (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
L2i : (y
1
j , y
2
j ) (y
2
j , y
3
j ) (y
3
j , y
1
j ) (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
Master List : L11 L
1
2 . . . L
1
n L
2
1 L
2
2 . . . L
2
m
Figure 4: Master list of preferences for resident couples in (2, 3)-hrc instance I.
L3i : x
1
i x¯
1
i x¯
2
i x
2
i (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
L4j : p
1
j p
2
j p
3
j (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
L5i : q
1
j q
2
j q
3
j (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
Master List : L31 L
3
2 . . . L
3
n L
4
1 L
4
2 . . . L
4
m L
5
1 L
5
2 . . . L
5
m
Figure 5: Master list of preferences for hospitals in (2, 3)-hrc instance I.
2.4 Complexity results for (3, 3)-hrc-dual-market with master lists
Theorem 5. Given an instance of (3, 3)-hrc, the problem of deciding whether the instance
supports a complete stable matching is NP-complete. The result holds even if all hospitals
have capacity 1.
Proof. The problem is clearly in NP, as a given assignment may be verified to be a complete,
stable matching in polynomial time.
We use a reduction from a restricted version of sat. More specifically, let (2,2)-e3-sat
denote the problem of deciding, given a Boolean formula B in CNF over a set of variables
V , whether B is satisfiable, where B has the following properties: (i) each clause contains
exactly 3 literals and (ii) for each vi ∈ V , each of literals vi and v¯i appears exactly twice in
B. Berman et al. [4] showed that (2,2)-e3-sat is NP-complete.
Let B be an instance of (2,2)-e3-sat. We construct an instance I of (3, 3)-hrc using
a similar reduction to that employed by Irving et al. [16]. Let V = {v0, v1, . . . , vn−1} and
C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} be the set of variables and clauses respectively in B. Then for each
vi ∈ V , each of literals vi and v¯i appears exactly twice in B. Also |cj |= 3 for each cj ∈ C.
(Hence m = 4n3 .) All hospitals in I have capacity 1.
The set of residents in I is X ∪ K ∪ P ∪ Q ∪ T , where X = ∪n−1i=0 Xi, Xi = {x4i+r :
0 ≤ r ≤ 3} (0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1), K = ∪n−1i=0 Ki, Ki = {k4i+r : 0 ≤ r ≤ 3} (0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1),
P = ∪mj=1Pj , Pj = {prj : 1 ≤ r ≤ 6} (1 ≤ j ≤ m), Q = {qj : cj ∈ C} and T = {tj : cj ∈ C}.
The residents in Q ∪ T are single and the residents in X ∪K ∪ P are involved in couples.
The set of hospitals in I is Y ∪L∪C ′ ∪Z, where Y = ∪n−1i=0 Yi, Yi = {y4i+r : 0 ≤ r ≤ 3}
(0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1), L = ∪n−1i=0 Li, Li = {l4i+r : 0 ≤ r ≤ 3} (0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1), C ′ = {csj : cj ∈
C ∧ 1 ≤ s ≤ 3} and Z = {zrj : 1 ≤ j ≤ m ∧ 1 ≤ r ≤ 5}.
In the joint preference list of a couple (x4i+r, k4i+r)(x4i+r ∈ X, k4i+r ∈ K), if r ∈ {0, 1},
the symbol c(x4i+r) denotes the hospital c
s
j ∈ C ′ such that the (r+1)th occurrence of literal
vi appears at position s of cj . Similarly if r ∈ {2, 3} then the symbol c(x4i+r) denotes the
hospital csj ∈ C ′ such that the (r − 1)th occurrence of literal v¯i appears at position s of cj .
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(x4i, k4i) : (y4i, l4i) (c(x4i), l4i+1) (y4i+1, l4i+1) (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
(x4i+1, k4i+1) : (y4i+1, l4i+1) (c(x4i+1), l4i+2) (y4i+2, l4i+2) (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
(x4i+2, k4i+2) : (y4i+3, l4i+3) (c(x4i+2), l4i+2) (y4i+2, l4i+2) (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
(x4i+3, k4i+3) : (y4i, l4i) (c(x4i+3), l4i+3) (y4i+3, l4i+3) (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
(p1j , p
4
j ) : (z
1
j , z
2
j ) (c
1
j , z
3
j ) (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
(p2j , p
5
j ) : (z
1
j , z
2
j ) (c
2
j , z
4
j ) (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
(p3j , p
6
j ) : (z
1
j , z
2
j ) (c
3
j , z
5
j ) (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
qj : c
1
j c
2
j c
3
j (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
tj : z
3
j z
4
j z
5
j (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
y4i : x4i x4i+3 (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
y4i+1 : x4i+1 x4i (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
y4i+2 : x4i+1 x4i+2 (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
y4i+3 : x4i+2 x4i+3 (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
l4i : k4i+3 k4i (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
l4i+1 : k4i k4i+1 (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
l4i+2 : k4i+2 k4i+1 (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
l4i+3 : k4i+3 k4i+2 (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
z1j : p
1
j p
2
j p
3
j (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
z2j : p
6
j p
5
j p
4
j (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
z3j : p
4
j tj (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
z4j : p
5
j tj (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
z5j : p
6
j tj (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
csj : p
s
j x(c
s
j) qj (1 ≤ j ≤ m ∧ 1 ≤ s ≤ 3)
Figure 6: Preference lists in I, the constructed instance of (3, 3)-hrc.
Also in the preference list of a hospital csj ∈ C ′, if literal vi appears at position s of clause
cj ∈ C, the symbol x(csj) denotes the resident x4i+r−1 where r = 1, 2 according as this is
the first or second occurrence of literal vi in B. Otherwise if literal v¯i appears at position
s of clause cj ∈ C, the symbol x(csj) denotes the resident x4i+r+1 where r = 1, 2 according
as this is the first or second occurrence of literal v¯i in B.
The preference lists of the residents and hospitals in I are shown in Figure 6 and
diagramatically in Figures 7 and 8. Clearly each preference list is of length at most 3.
For each i (0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1), let Ti = {(x4i+r, y4i+r) : 0 ≤ r ≤ 3} ∪ {(k4i+r, l4i+r) : 0 ≤
r ≤ 3} and Fi = {(x4i+r, y4i+r+1)} : 0 ≤ r ≤ 3} ∪ {(k4i+r, l4i+r+1)} : 0 ≤ r ≤ 3}, where
addition is taken modulo 4.
We claim that B is satisfiable if and only if I admits a complete stable matching.
Firstly suppose that B is satisfiable and let f be a satisfying truth assignment of B.
Define a complete matching M in I as follows. For each variable vi ∈ V , if vi is true under
f , add the pairs in Ti to M , otherwise add the pairs in Fi to M .
Let j(1 ≤ j ≤ m) be given. Then cj contains at least one literal that is true under
f . Suppose this literal occurs at position s of cj (1 ≤ s ≤ 3). Then add the pairs (qj , csj),
(psj , z
1
j ) and (p
s+3
j , z
2
j ) to M . For each b(1 ≤ b ≤ 3, b 6= s) add the pairs (pbj , cbj) and
(pb+3j , z
b+2
j ) to M . Finally add the pair (tj , z
s+2
j ) to M .
No resident in Q may form a blocking pair (since he can only potentially prefer a hospital
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Figure 7: Diagram of subset of agents in I, the constructed instance of (3, 3)-hrc.
Figure 8: Diagram of subset of agents in I, the constructed instance of (3, 3)-hrc.
15
in C, which ranks him last) nor can a resident in T (since he can only potentially prefer a
hospital zj(3 ≤ j ≤ 5) who ranks him last).
Suppose that (x4i+r, k4i+r) blocks M with (c(x4i+r), l4i+a), where 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, 0 ≤
r ≤ 3 and 1 ≤ a ≤ 3. Then (x4i+r, k4i+r) are jointly matched with their third choice pair.
Case (i): r ∈ {0, 1}. Then f(vi) = F because (x4i+r, y4i+r+1) ∈ M and (k4i+r, l4i+r+1) ∈
M . Let csj = c(x4i+r)(1 ≤ s ≤ 3and1 ≤ j ≤ m). As vi does not make cj true then
(psj , c
s
j) ∈ M . This means that csj has its first choice and cannot form part of a blocking
pair, a contradiction.
Case (ii): r ∈ {2, 3} Then f(vi) = T because (x4i+r, y4i+r) ∈M and (k4i+r, l4i+r) ∈M . Let
csj = c(x4i+r)(1 ≤ s ≤ 3and1 ≤ j ≤ m). As v¯i does not make cj true then (psj , csj) ∈M . This
means that csj has its first choice and cannot form part of a blocking pair, a contradiction.
Now suppose (psj , p
s+3
j ) blocks M . Then (p
s
j , c
s
j) ∈ M and (ps+3j , zs+2j ) ∈ M , and
(psj , p
s+3
j ) jointly prefer (z
1
j , z
2
j ) to their partners. At most one of {z1j , z2j } can prefer the
relevant member of {psj , ps+3j } to their partner, whilst the other would prefer their current
partner in M and thus could not form part of a blocking pair, a contradiction. Hence, M
is a complete stable matching in I.
Conversely suppose that M is a complete stable matching in I. We form a truth
assignment f in B as follows. For each i (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1), M ∩ ((Xi × Yi) ∪ (Ki × Li)) is a
perfect matching of (Xi ∪ Yi) ∪ (Ki ∪ Li). If M ∩ ((Xi × Yi) ∪ (Ki × Li)) = Ti, set vi to be
true under f . Otherwise M ∩ ((Xi × Yi) ∪ (Ki × Li)) = Fi, in which case we set vi to be
false under f .
Now let cj be a clause in C (1 ≤ j ≤ m). There exists some s (1 ≤ s ≤ 3) such that
(qj , c
s
j) ∈M . Let x4i+r = x(csj), for some i (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1) and r (0 ≤ r ≤ 3). If r ∈ {0, 1}
then (x4i+r, y4i+r) ∈ M (or equivalently (k4i+r, l4i+r) ∈ M) by the stability of M . Thus
variable vi is true under f , and hence clause cj is true under f , since literal vi occurs in
cj . If r ∈ {2, 3} then (x4i+r, y4i+r+1) ∈ M (or equivalently (k4i+r, l4i+r+1) ∈ M) (where
addition is taken modulo 4) by the stability of M . Thus variable vi is false under f , and
hence clause cj is true under f , since literal v¯i occurs in cj . Hence f is a satisfying truth
assignment of B.
Thus, the claim holds and B is satisfiable if and only if I admits a complete, stable
matching.
Let I be the instance of (3, 3)-com-hrc as constructed in the proof of Theorem 5 from
an instance of (2,2)-e3-sat. We add additional residents and hospitals to I to obtain a
new instance I ′ of (3, 3)-com-hrc as follows. For every y4i+r ∈ Y add further residents
U = ∪n−1i=0 Ui, Ui = {us4i+r : 1 ≤ s ≤ 5 ∧ 0 ≤ r ≤ 3} and further hospitals H = ∪n−1i=0 Hi, Hi =
{hs4i+r : 1 ≤ s ≤ 4 ∧ 0 ≤ r ≤ 3}. The preference lists of the agents so added for a single
y4i+r ∈ Y are shown in Figure 9 and diagrammatically in Figure 10 where Φ4i+r represents
those preferences expressed by y4i+r in I
′ \ (U ∪H).
Lemma 6. In any stable matching M in I ′, for every y4i+r ∈ Y , M(y4i+r) ∈ X.
Proof. Suppose not. Then y4i+r is either unmatched in M or M(y4i+r) = u
5
4i+r. If y4i+r
is unmatched then (u54i+r, y4i+r) blocks M in I
′, a contradiction. Hence, M(y4i+r) = u54i+r
and thus (u54i+r, h
1
4i+r) /∈M .
Assume that h14i+r is unmatched in M . Then (u
1
4i+r, u
2
4i+r) is unmatched in M and
M((u34i+r, u
4
4i+r)) 6= (h14i+r, h44i+r). Thus, either (u34i+r, u44i+r) is unmatched in M or
M((u34i+r, u
4
4i+r)) = (h
3
4i+r, h
2
4i+r). If (u
3
4i+r, u
4
4i+r) is unmatched in M then (u
1
4i+r, u
2
4i+r)
blocks M with (h14i+r, h
2
4i+r) in I
′, a contradiction. Hence (u34i+r, u
4
4i+r) must be matched
with (h34i+r, h
2
4i+r) in M . However, now (u
3
4i+r, u
4
4i+r) blocks M with (h
1
4i+r, h
4
4i+r) in I
′, a
contradiction.
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(u14i+r, u
2
4i+r) : (h
1
4i+r, h
2
4i+r) (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, 0 ≤ r ≤ 3)
(u34i+r, u
4
4i+r) : (h
1
4i+r, h
4
4i+r) (h
3
4i+r, h
2
4i+r) (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, 0 ≤ r ≤ 3)
u54i+r : y4i+r h
1
4i+r (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, 0 ≤ r ≤ 3)
y4i+r : Φ4i+r u
5
4i+r (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, 0 ≤ r ≤ 3)
h14i+r : u
5
4i+r u
1
4i+r u
3
4i+r (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, 0 ≤ r ≤ 3)
h24i+r : u
4
4i+r u
2
4i+r (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, 0 ≤ r ≤ 3)
h34i+r : u
3
4i+r (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, 0 ≤ r ≤ 3)
h44i+r : u
4
4i+r (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, 0 ≤ r ≤ 3)
Figure 9: Added agents in I ′, the constructed instance of (3, 3)-hrc.
Figure 10: Diagram of added agents in I ′, the constructed instance of (3, 3)-hrc.
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Now, assume h14i+r is matched in M . Further assume that h
1
4i+r is matched in M
through the joint matching of (u14i+r, u
2
4i+r) with (h
1
4i+r, h
2
4i+r). However, in this case, M
is blocked by (u34i+r, u
4
4i+r) with (h
3
4i+r, h
2
4i+r) in I
′, a contradiction. Thus, h14i+r must be
matched in M through the joint matching of (u34i+r, u
4
4i+r) with (h
1
4i+r, h
4
4i+r). However,
in this case, M is blocked by (u14i+r, u
2
4i+r) with (h
1
4i+r, h
2
4i+r) in I
′, a contradiction.
We now show through the following two Lemmata that if M ′ is a stable matching in I ′
and
M = M ′ \ {(up4i+r, hq4i+r) : 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, 0 ≤ r ≤ 3, 1 ≤ p ≤ 5, 1 ≤ q ≤ 5}
then M is a complete stable matching in I, the reduced (3, 3)-hrc instance obtained by
removing all of the agents in U ∪H from I ′.
Lemma 7. No hospital in Z ∪C may be unmatched and no resident in P ∪ T ∪Q may be
unmatched in any stable matching M in I ′.
Proof. Assume z1j is unmatched in M for some j (1 ≤ j ≤ m). Thus (psj , z2j ) /∈M (4 ≤ s ≤
6) as z2j must also be unmatched. Hence, (z
1
j , z
2
j ) are jointly unmatched and find (p
1
j , p
4
j )
acceptable. Further, (p1j , p
4
j ) jointly prefers (z
1
j , z
2
j ) to any other pair. Hence (z
1
j , z
2
j ) blocks
M with (p1j , p
4
j ), a contradiction. Thus, z
1
j must be matched in any stable matching admitted
by I ′. By a similar argument, the same holds for z2j .
Assume tj is unmatched in M for some j (1 ≤ j ≤ m). If some zsj (3 ≤ s ≤ 5) is
unmatched, then (tsj , z
s
j ) blocks M in I
′, a contradiction. Thus, {(p4j , z3j ), (p5j , z4j ), (p6j , z5j )} ⊆
M . Then z2j is unmatched, a contradiction. Thus, tj must be matched in any matching
admitted by I ′.
Assume some resident psj is unmatched in M for some j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) and s (1 ≤
s ≤ 3). Then (psj , ps+3j ) is unmatched. Hence, (psj , ps+3j ) blocks M in I ′ with (csj , zs+2j ), a
contradiction. Thus, all psj (1 ≤ s ≤ 6) must be matched in any stable matching admitted
by I ′.
Assume some zsj (3 ≤ s ≤ 5) is unmatched in M . Thus either tj is unmatched in M
or ps+1j is unmatched in M . As shown previously, tj cannot be unmatched so (tj , z
b
j) ∈ M
for some b ∈ {3, 4, 5} \ {s}. Also, as shown previously ps+1j cannot be unmatched so
(ps+1j , z
2
j ) ∈M , but then pb+1j is unmatched in M , a contradiction. Thus, all zsj (3 ≤ s ≤ 5)
must be matched in any stable matching admitted by I ′
Observe that no csj (1 ≤ s ≤ 3, 1 ≤ j ≤ m) can be matched to x(csj), for otherwise
M(y4i+r) /∈ X for some y4i+r ∈ Y a contradiction to Lemma 6. Since z1j must be matched
to some psj (1 ≤ s ≤ 3) and since no resident in P may be unmatched, then for s′ ∈ {1, 2, 3}
such that s′ 6= s, cs′j must be matched with the corresponding ps
′
j . Thus, (qj , c
s
j) ∈ M
for otherwise (qj , c
s
j) blocks M in I
′. Thus all residents in Q and hospitals in C must be
matched in any stable matching admitted by I ′.
Lemma 8. No hospital in L ∪ Y may be unmatched and no resident in K ∪ X may be
unmatched in any stable matching M in I ′.
Proof. By Lemma 6, M(y4i+r) ∈ X for all y4i+r ∈ Y . Hence M(x4i+r) ∈ Y for all x4i+r ∈
X. Since (x4i+r, k4i+r) are a couple for all x4i+r ∈ X, it follows that M(k4i+r) ∈ L for all
k4i+r ∈ K and M(l4i+r) ∈ K for all l4i+r ∈ L.
The proof of the previous three Lemmas allows us to now state the following more
general theorem.
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Theorem 9. Given an instance, I ′ of (3, 3)-hrc, the problem of deciding whether I ′ admits
a stable matching is NP-complete.
Proof. Let B be an instance of (2,2)-e3-sat. Construct an instance I of (3, 3)-hrc as
described in the proof of Theorem 5 and as illustrated in Figure 6 and extend this instance
as described above and as illustrated in Figure 9 to obtain the instance I ′ of (3, 3)-hrc.
Let f be a satisfying truth assignment of B. Define a matching M in I as in the proof
of Theorem 5. Define a matching M ′ in I ′ as follows:
M ′ = M ∪ {(u54i+r, h14i+r), (u34i+r, h34i+r), (u44i+r, h24i+r) : 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, 0 ≤ r ≤ 3}
As shown previously no agent in X ∪K ∪L∪P ∪Q∪ T ∪Z ∪C can block M ′ in I. By
Lemma 6, M ′(y4i+r) ∈ X for any stable matching M ′ in I ′. Thus, it must be the case that
M ′(u54i+r) = h
1
4i+r otherwise (u
5
4i+r, h
1
4i+r) would block M
′. Further M ′((u34i+r, u
4
4i+r)) =
(h34i+r, h
2
4i+r) or M
′ must admit a blocking pair amongst the agents in the subinstance S.
Thus, no agent in Y ∪ U ∪H can block M ′ in I. Thus M ′ is a stable matching in I.
Conversely, suppose that M ′ is a stable matching in I. By Lemma 6, every y4i+r is
matched in M ′ to a resident in X. By Lemmas 7 and 8 every agent in K∪X∪P∪T∪Q∪Z∪C
is matched in M ′.
Now let
M = M ′ \ {(up4i+r, hq4i+r) : 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, 0 ≤ r ≤ 3, 1 ≤ p ≤ 5, 1 ≤ q ≤ 5}
Then M is a complete stable matching in I, the reduced (3, 3)-hrc instance obtained
by removing all of the agents in U ∪H from I ′. By the proof of Theorem 5 we can obtain
a satisfying truth assignment for B from M .
Recall that an instance of (3, 3)-hrc-dual-market is an instance of hrc-dual-market
in which no resident, couple or hospital has a preference list of length greater than 3. We
now show that the instance described in Theorem 9 represents a dual market and thus we
are able to show that deciding whether a stbale matching exists in an instance of (3, 3)-
hrc-dual-market is also NP-complete.
Corollary 10. Given an instance of (3, 3)-hrc-dual-market, the problem of deciding
whether a stable matching exists is NP-complete. The result holds even if each hospital has
capacity 1 and the preference list of each single resident, couple and hospital is derived from
a strictly ordered master list of hospitals, pairs of hospitals and residents respectively.
Proof. Let I ′ be the instance of (3, 3)-hrc constructed in the proof of Theorem 9. The
residents in I ′ can be partitioned into two disjoint sets, R1 = X ∪ P1 ∪ Q ∪ U1 where
P1 = {psj : 1 ≤ s ≤ 3} and U1 = {us4i+r : s ∈ {1, 3, 5}} and R2 = K ∪ P2 ∪ T ∪ U2 where
P2 = {psj : 4 ≤ s ≤ 6} and U2 = {us4i+r : s ∈ {2, 4}}. Further, the hospitals in I ′ may also
be partitioned into two disjoint sets, A1 = Y ∪ Z1 ∪ C ∪H1 where Z1 = {z1j : 1 ≤ j ≤ m}
and H1 = {hs4i+r : 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, 0 ≤ r ≤ 3, s ∈ {1, 3}} and A2 = L ∪ Z2 ∪ H2 where
Z2 = {zsj : 2 ≤ s ≤ 5 ∧ 1 ≤ j ≤ m} and H2 = {hs4i+r : 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, 0 ≤ r ≤ 3, s ∈ {2, 4}}.
A resident r ∈ Ri finds acceptable only those hospitals in Ai and a hospital h ∈ Ai
finds acceptable only those residents in Ri. From this construction it can be seen that
the instance I ′ represents a dual market consisting of two disjoint markets, (R1 ∪ A1) and
(R2 ∪A2).
The master lists shown in Figures 11, 12 and 13 indicate that the preference list of each
single resident, couple and hospital may be derived from a master list of hospital pairs,
residents and hospitals respectively. Thus, the result follows immediately from Theorem
9.
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3 Integer programming models for Hospitals / Residents
problem variants
In this section we present a range of IP models for hr, hrc and hrct. We begin by giving
an IP model for hr in Section 3.1. This model is then extended in Section 3.2 to the hrc
context. We further provide a worked example in Section 3.3 with a view to demonstrating
how the IP model for hrc may be constructed from a small example instance. We then
extend the IP model for hrc to the more general hrct context in Section 3.4. Detailed
proofs of the correctness of both the hr, hrc and hrct models are also presented in the
relevant sections.
3.1 An IP formulation for the hr
3.1.1 Variables in the IP model for hr
The IP model is designed around a series of linear inequalities that establish the absence of
blocking pairs. The variables are defined for each resident and for each element on his/her
preference list (with the possibility of being unmatched).
Let I be an instance of hr with residents R = {r1, r2, . . . , rn1} and hospitals H =
{h1, h2, . . . , hn2} where each resident ri ∈ R, has a preference list of length l(ri) consisting
of individual hospitals hj ∈ H. Each hospital hj ∈ H has a preference list of individual
residents ri ∈ R of length l(hj). Further, each hospital hj has a capacity cj representing
the number of available posts it has to match with residents.
Let J be the following Integer Programming (IP) formulation of I. In J , for each
i (1 ≤ i ≤ n1) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(ri)), define a variable xi,p such that
xi,p =
{
1 if ri is assigned to their p
th choice hospital
0 otherwise
For p = l(ri) + 1 define a variable xi,p whose intuitive meaning is that resident ri is
unassigned. Therefore we also have
xi,l(ri)+1 =
{
1 if ri is unassigned
0 otherwise
Let X = {xi,p : 1 ≤ i ≤ n1 ∧ 1 ≤ p ≤ l(ri) + 1}. Let pref(ri, p) denote the hospital
at position p of ri’s preference list where 1 ≤ i ≤ n1 and 1 ≤ p ≤ l(ri). Further for an
acceptable resident-hospital pair (ri, hj), let rank(hj , ri) = q denote the rank which hospital
hj assigns resident ri, where 1 ≤ j ≤ n2, 1 ≤ i ≤ n1 and 1 ≤ q ≤ l(hj).
3.1.2 Constraints in the IP model for hr
The following constraint simply confirms that each variable xi,p must be binary valued for
all i (1 ≤ i ≤ n1) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(ri) + 1):
xi,p ∈ {0, 1} (4)
As each resident ri ∈ R is either assigned to a single hospital or is unassigned, we
introduce the following constraint for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ n1):
l(ri)+1∑
p=1
xi,p = 1 (5)
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Since a hospital hj may be assigned to at most cj residents, xi,p = 1 where pref(ri, p) =
hj for at most cj residents. We thus obtain the following constraint for all j (1 ≤ j ≤ n2):
n1∑
i=1
l(ri)∑
p=1
{xi,p ∈ X : pref(ri, p) = hj} ≤ cj (6)
In a stable matching M in I, if a single resident ri ∈ R has a worse partner than
some hospital hj ∈ H where pref(ri, p) = hj and rank(hj , ri) = q then hj must be fully
subscribed with better partners than ri. Therefore, either
l(ri)+1∑
p′=p+1
xi,p′ = 0 or hj is fully
subscribed with better partners than ri and
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ : rank(hj , ri′) = q′ ∧ pref(ri′ , p′′) =
hj)} = cj .
Thus, for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n1) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(ri)) we obtain the following constraint
where pref(ri, p) = hj and rank(hj , ri) = q:
cj
l(ri)+1∑
p′=p+1
xi,p′ ≤
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ : rank(hj , ri′) = q′ ∧ pref(ri′,p′′) = hj)} (7)
Objective Function - A maximum cardinalilty matching M in I is a stable matching
in which the largest number of residents is matched amongst all of the stable matchings
admitted by I. To maximise the size of the stable matching found we apply the following
objective function:
max
n∑
i=1
l(ri)∑
p=1
xi,p (8)
3.1.3 Proof of correctness the IP model for HR
Theorem 11. Given an instance I of hr, let J be the corresponding IP model as defined
in Section 3.1.1 and Section section:IPModelsHRConstraints. A stable matching in I is
exactly equivalent to a feasible solution to J .
Proof. Consider a stable matching M in I. From M we form an assignment of values to
the variables x as follows.
Initially set xi,p = 0 for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ n1) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(ri) + 1). Then for each
(ri, hj) ∈ M set xi,p = 1, where hj = pref(ri, p). If ri is unassigned then set xi,l(ri)+1 = 1.
As each resident has a single partner or is unassigned (but not both), for a given i (1 ≤ i ≤
n1), for exactly one value of p in the range 1 ≤ p ≤ r(i) + 1, xi,p = 1, and for each other
value of p in the same range, xi,p = 0, and therefore Constraint 5 holds in the assignment
derived from M . Since each hospital is assigned in M to at most cj acceptable residents,
Constraint 6 also holds in the assignment derived from M .
Let (ri, hj) be an acceptable pair not in M . For (ri, hj) to block, ri must have a partner
worse than rank p while simultaneously hj is either under-subscribed or has a partner worse
than rank q, where pref(ri, p) = hj and rank(hj , ri) = q. If ri does not have a partner
worse than hj then cj
l(ri)+1∑
p′=p+1
xi,p′ = 0 and otherwise cj
l(ri)+1∑
p′=p+1
xi,p′ = cj . If hj has cj partners
better than ri then
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ : rank(hj , ri′) = q′ ∧ pref(ri′,p′′) = hj)} = cj otherwise
22
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ : rank(hj , ri′) = q′ ∧ pref(ri′,p′′) = hj)} < cj .
Suppose cj
l(ri)+1∑
p′=p+1
xi,p′ = cj . Then ri is unassigned or has a worse partner than hj in
M . Thus, by the stability of M , hj is full and all of hj ’s partners are better than ri. Hence
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ : rank(hj , ri′) = q′ ∧ pref(ri′ , p′′) = hj)} = cj and Constraint 7 is satisfied by
the assignment derived from M .
Now, suppose cj
l(ri)+1∑
p′=p+1
xi,p′ = 0. Then ri has a better partner than hj in M . Since
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ : rank(hj , ri′) = q′ ∧ pref(ri′ , p′′) = hj)} ≥ 0, Constraint 7 is satisfied by the
assignment derived from M .
As all of the constraints in J hold for an assignment derived from a stable matching M ,
a stable matching M in I represents a feasible solution to J .
Conversely, consider a feasible solution, 〈x,y〉, to J . From such a solution we form a
set of pairs, M , as follows.
Initially let M = ∅. For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n1) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(ri)) if xi,p = 1 then add
(ri, hj) to M where hj = pref(ri, p). As 〈x〉 satisfies constraints 4, 5 and 6, each resident in
M must have exactly one partner or be unassigned (but not both) and each hospital hj in
M must have at most cj partners. Therefore the set of pairs M created from the solution
〈x〉 to J , is a matching in I.
We now show that M is stable. Assume (ri, hj) blocks M . Let pref(ri, p) = hj and
rank(hj , ri) = q. Therefore, ri is unassigned or, has a worse partner than hj and hj is
under-subscribed or prefers ri to some member of M(hj). However, this implies that in
J , cj
l(ri)+1∑
p′=p+1
xi,p′ = cj and
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ : rank(hj , ri′) = q′ ∧ pref(ri′,p′′) = hj)} < cj and
therefore Constraint 7 is not satisfied in J , a contradiction. Therefore no such (ri, hj) can
block M .
3.2 An IP formulation for hrc
3.2.1 Variables in the IP model for hrc
The IP model extends the model for hr presented in Section 3.1. This extended model
is designed around a series of linear inequalities that establish the absence of blocking
pairs according to each of the different parts of Definition 1. The variables are defined for
each resident, whether single or a member of a couple, and for each element on his/her
preference list (with the possibility of being unmatched). A further consistency constraint
ensures that each member of a couple obtains hospitals from the same pair in their list,
if assigned. Finally, the objective of the IP is to maximise the size of a stable matching,
if one exists. The model presented is more complex than existing IP formulations in the
literature for stable matching problems [30, 27, 24, 17] simply because of the number of
blocking pair cases in Definition 1 required to adequately take account of couples.
Let I be an instance of hrc with residents R = {r1, r2, . . . , rn1} and hospitals H =
{h1, h2, . . . , hn2}. Without loss of generality, suppose residents r1, r2 . . . r2c are in couples.
Again, without loss of generality, suppose that the couples are (r2i−1, r2i) (1 ≤ i ≤ c).
Suppose that the joint preference list of a couple ci = (r2i−1, r2i) is:
ci : (hα1 , hβ1), (hα2 , hβ2) . . . (hαl , hβl)
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From this list we create the following projected preference list for resident r2i−1:
r2i−1 : hα1 , hα2 . . . hαl
and the following projected preference list for resident r2i:
r2i : hβ1 , hβ2 . . . hβl
Clearly, the projected preference list of the residents r2i−1 and r2i are the same length
as the preference list of the couple ci = (r2i−1, r2i). Let l(ci) denote the lengths of the
preference list of ci and let l(r2i−1) and l(r2i) denote the lengths of the projected preference
lists of r2i−1 and r2i respectively. Then l(r2i−1) = l(r2i) = l(ci). A given hospital hj may
appear more than once in the projected preference list of a linked resident in a couple
ci = (r2i−1, r2i).
Let the single residents be r2c+1, r2c+2 . . . rn1 , where each single resident ri, has a pref-
erence list of length l(ri) consisting of individual hospitals hj ∈ H.
Each hospital hj ∈ H has a preference list of individual residents ri ∈ R of length l(hj).
Further, each hospital hj ∈ H has capacity cj ≥ 1, the number of residents with which it
may match.
Let J be the following Integer Programming (IP) formulation of I. In J , for each
i (1 ≤ i ≤ n1) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(ri)), define a variable xi,p such that
xi,p =
{
1 if ri is assigned to their p
th choice hospital
0 otherwise
For p = l(ri) + 1 define a variable xi,p whose intuitive meaning is that resident ri is
unassigned. Therefore we also have
xi,l(ri)+1 =
{
1 if ri is unassigned
0 otherwise
Let X = {xi,p : 1 ≤ i ≤ n1 ∧ 1 ≤ p ≤ l(ri) + 1}. Let pref(ri, p) denote the hospital
at position p of a single resident ri’s preference list or on the projected preference list of a
resident belonging to a couple where 1 ≤ i ≤ n1 and 1 ≤ p ≤ l(ri). Let pref((r2i, r2i−1), p)
denote the hospital pair at position p on the joint preference list of (r2i−1, r2i).
For an acceptable resident-hospital pair (ri, hj), let rank(hj , ri) = q denote the rank
which hospital hj assigns resident ri where 1 ≤ j ≤ n2, 1 ≤ i ≤ n1 and 1 ≤ q ≤ l(hj).
Thus, rank(hj , ri) is equal to the number of residents that hj prefers to ri plus one.
Further, for i (1 ≤ i ≤ n1), j (1 ≤ j ≤ n2), p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(ri)) and q (1 ≤ q ≤ l(hj))
let the set R(hj , q) contain resident integer pairs (ri, p) such that rank(hj , ri) = q and
pref(ri, p) = hj . Hence:
R(hj , q) = {(ri, p) ∈ R× Z : rank(hj , ri) = q ∧ 1 ≤ p ≤ l(ri) ∧ pref(ri, p) = hj}
Intuitively, the set R(hj , q) contains the resident-position pairs (ri, p) such that ri is
assigned a rank of q (1 ≤ q ≤ l(hj)) by hj and hj is in position p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(ri)) on ri’s
preference list.
When considering the exact nature of a blocking pair in the description that follows,
the stability definition due to Manlove and McDermid [20] (MM-stability) is applied in all
cases. The text in bold before the definition of a constraint shows the section of the MM-
stability definition with which the constraint corresponds. Hence, a constraint preceded by
‘Stability 1’ is intended to prevent blocking pairs described by part 1 of the MM-stability
definition shown in Definition 1 in Section 1.
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3.2.2 Constraints in the IP model for hrc
The following constraint simply confirms that each variable xi,p must be binary valued for
all i (1 ≤ i ≤ n1) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(ri) + 1):
xi,p ∈ {0, 1} (9)
Similarly, the following constraint confirms that each variable αj,q must be binary valued
for all j (1 ≤ j ≤ n2) and q (1 ≤ q ≤ l(hj)):
αj,q ∈ {0, 1} (10)
Also, the following constraint confirms that each variable βj,q must be binary valued for
all j (1 ≤ j ≤ n2) and q (1 ≤ q ≤ l(hj)):
βj,q ∈ {0, 1} (11)
As each resident ri ∈ R is either assigned to a single hospital or is unassigned, we
introduce the following constraint for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ n1):
l(ri)+1∑
p=1
xi,p = 1 (12)
Since a hospital hj may match with at most cj residents, xi,p = 1 where pref(ri, p) = hj
for at most cj residents. We thus obtain the following constraint for all j (1 ≤ j ≤ n2):
n1∑
i=1
l(ri)∑
p=1
{xi,p ∈ X : pref(ri, p) = hj} ≤ cj (13)
For each couple (r2i−1, r2i), if resident r2i−1 is assigned to the hospital in position p in
their projected preference list then r2i must also be assigned to the hospital in position p
in their projected preference list. We thus obtain the following constraint for all 1 ≤ i ≤ c
and 1 ≤ p ≤ l(r2i−1) + 1:
x2i−1,p = x2i,p (14)
Stability 1 - In a stable matching M in I, if a single resident ri ∈ R has a worse partner
than some hospital hj ∈ H where pref(ri, p) = hj and rank(hj , ri) = q then hj must be
fully subscribed with better partners than ri. Therefore, either
l(ri)+1∑
p′=p+1
xi,p′ = 0 or hj is fully
subscribed with better partners than ri and
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′)} = cj .
Thus, for each i (2c + 1 ≤ i ≤ n1) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(ri)) we obtain the following
constraint where pref(ri, p) = hj and rank(hj , ri) = q:
cj
l(ri)+1∑
p′=p+1
xi,p′ ≤
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′)} (15)
Stability 2(a) - In a stable matching M in I, if a couple ci = (r2i−1, r2i) prefers
hospital pair (hj1 , hj2) (which is at position p1 on ci’s preference list) to (M(r2i−1),M(r2i))
(which is at position p2) then it must not be the case that, if hj2 = M(r2i) then hj1 is
under-subscribed or prefers r2i−1 to one of its partners in M . In the special case in which
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pref(r2i−1, p1) = pref(r2i, p1) = hj1 it must not be the case that, if hj1 = hj2 = M(r2i)
then hj1 is under-subscribed or prefers r2i−1 to one of its partners in M other than r2i.
Thus, for the general case, we obtain the following constraint for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ c) and
p1, p2 (1 ≤ p1 < p2 ≤ l(r2i−1)) such that pref(r2i, p1) = pref(r2i, p2) and rank(hj1 , r2i−1) =
q:
cj1x2i,p2 ≤
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj1 , q′)} (16)
However, for the special case in which pref(r2i−1, p1) = pref(r2i, p1) = hj1 we obtain
the following constraint for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ c) and p1, p2 where (1 ≤ p1 < p2 ≤ l(r2i−1)) such
that pref(r2i, p1) = pref(r2i, p2) and rank(hj1 , r2i−1) = q:
(cj1 − 1)x2i,p2 ≤
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : q′ 6= rank(hj1 , r2i) ∧ (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj1 , q′)} (17)
Stability 2(b) - A similar constraint is required for the odd members of each couple.
Thus, for the general case, we obtain the following constraint for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ c)
and p1, p2 where (1 ≤ p1 < p2 ≤ l(r2i)) such that pref(r2i−1, p1) = pref(r2i−1, p2) and
rank(hj2 , r2i) = q:
cj2x2i−1,p2 ∈ X ≤
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ : (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj2 , q′)} (18)
Again, for the special case in which pref(r2i−1, p1) = pref(r2i, p1) = hj2 we obtain the
following constraint for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ c) and p1, p2 where (1 ≤ p1 < p2 ≤ l(r2i)) such that
pref(r2i−1, p1) = pref(r2i−1, p2) and rank(hj2 , r2i) = q:
(cj1 − 1)x2i−1,p2 ≤
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : q′ 6= rank(hj2 , r2i−1) ∧ (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj2 , q′)} (19)
For all j (1 ≤ j ≤ n2) and q (1 ≤ q ≤ l(hj)) define a new constraint such that:
αj,q ≥ 1−
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′)}
cj
(20)
Thus, if hj is full with assignees better than rank q then αj,q may take the value 0 or 1.
However, if hj is not full with assignees better than rank q then αj,q = 1.
For all j (1 ≤ j ≤ n2) and q (1 ≤ q ≤ l(hj)) define a new constraint such that:
βj,q ≥ 1−
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′)}
(cj − 1) (21)
Thus, if hj has cj − 1 or more assignees better than rank q then βj,q may take the value
0 or 1. However, if hj has less than cj − 1 assignees better than rank q then βj,q = 1.
Stability 3(a) - In a stable matching M in I, if a couple ci = (r2i−1, r2i) is assigned
to a worse pair than hospital pair (hj1 , hj2) (where hj1 6= hj2) it must be the case that for
some t ∈ {1, 2}, hjt is full and prefers its worst assignee to r2i−2+t.
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Thus we obtain the following constraint for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ c) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(r2i−1))
where hj1 = pref(r2i−1, p), hj2 = pref(r2i, p), hj1 6= hj2 , rank(hj1 , r2i−1) = q1 and
rank(hj2 , r2i) = q2:
l(r2i−1)+1∑
p′=p+1
x2i−1,p′ + αj1,q1 + αj2,q2 ≤ 2 (22)
Stability 3(b) - In a stable matching M in I, if a couple ci = (r2i−1, r2i) is assigned
to a worse pair than (hj , hj) where M(r2i−1) 6= hj and M(r2i) 6= hj then hj must not have
two or more free posts available.
Stability 3(c) - In a stable matching M in I, if a couple ci = (r2i−1, r2i) is assigned to
a worse pair than (hj , hj) where M(r2i−1) 6= hj and M(r2i) 6= hj then hj must not prefer
at least one of r2i−1 or r2i to some assignee of hj in M while having a single free post.
Both of the preceding stability definitions may be modeled by a single constraint. Thus,
we obtain the following constraint for i (1 ≤ i ≤ c) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(r2i−1)) such
that pref(r2i−1, p) = pref(r2i, p) and hj = pref(r2i−1, p) where q = min{rank(hj , r2i),
rank(hj , r2i−1)} :
cj
l(r2i−1)+1∑
p′=p+1
x2i−1,p′ −
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′)}
(cj − 1)
≤
l(hj)∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′ , p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′)} (23)
Stability 3(d) - In a stable matching M in I, if a couple ci = (r2i−1, r2i) is jointly
assigned to a worse pair than (hj , hj) where M(r2i−1) 6= hj and M(r2i) 6= hj then hj must
not be fully subscribed and also have two assigned partners rx and ry (where x 6= y) such
that hj strictly prefers r2i−1 to rx and also prefers r2i to ry.
For each (hj , hj) acceptable to (r2i−1, r2i), let rmin be the better of r2i−1 and r2i ac-
cording to hospital hj with rank(hj , rmin) = qmin. Analogously, let rmax be the worse
of r2i and r2i−1 according to hospital hj with rank(hj , rmax) = qmax. Thus we ob-
tain the following constraint for i (1 ≤ i ≤ c) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(r2i−1)) such that
pref(r2i−1, p) = pref(r2i, p) = hj .
l(r2i−1)+1∑
p′=p+1
x2i−1,p′ + αj,qmax + βj,qmin ≤ 2 (24)
Objective Function - A maximum cardinalilty matching M in I is a stable matching
in which the largest number of residents is matched amongst all of the stable matchings
admitted by I. To maximise the size of the stable matching found we apply the following
objective function:
max
n1∑
i=1
l(ri)∑
p=1
xi,p (25)
3.2.3 Proof of correctness of constraints in the IP model for hrc
Theorem 12. Given an instance I of hr, let J be the corresponding IP model as defined
in Section 3.2.1 and Section section:IPModelsHRCConstraints. A stable matching in I is
exactly equivalent to a feasible solution to J .
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Proof. Consider a stable matching M in I. From M we form an assignment of values to
the variables x, α, and β as follows.
Initially set xi,p = 0 for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ n1) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(ri) + 1). Then for
each (ri, hj) ∈ M where ri is a single resident, set xi,p = 1, where pref(ri, p) = hj . If
ri is unassigned then set xi,l(ri)+1 = 1. If ri is a linked resident, assume without loss
of generality that ri = r2i−1 (respectively r2i) then set x2i−1,p = 1 (respectively x2i,p =
1) where pref((r2i−1, r2i), p) = (hj1 , hj2) where hj1 = M(r2i−1) and hj2 = M((r2i). If
(r2i−1, r2i) is unassigned then set x2i−1,l(r2i−1)+1 = 1 and x2i,l(r2i)+1 = 1.
As each resident has a single partner or is unassigned (but not both), for a given
i (1 ≤ i ≤ n1), for exactly one value of p in the range 1 ≤ p ≤ r(i) + 1, xi,p = 1, and for
each other value of p in the same range, xi,p = 0, and therefore Constraint 12 holds for x.
Also, if xi,p = 1 then for all p
′ 6= p such that pref(ri, p) = pref(ri, p′), xi,p′ = 0.
Initially set αj,q = 0 for all j (1 ≤ j ≤ n2) and q (1 ≤ q ≤ l(hj)). Then for each αj,q, if
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′)} < cj
then set αj,q = 1. Initially set βj,q = 0 for all j (1 ≤ j ≤ n2) and q (1 ≤ q ≤ l(hj)). Then
for each βj,q, if
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′)} < cj − 1
then set βj,q = 1.
Since, each hospital hj is assigned to at most cj acceptable residents in M , Constraint
13 also holds for x.
For each couple (r2i−1, r2i) in I, let p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(r2i−1)) be given. If r2i−1 is assigned
to hj1 = pref(r2i−1, p) in M then r2i is assigned to hj2 = pref(r2i, p) in M . Similarly, for
each couple (r2i−1, r2i) in I, if r2i−1 is not assigned to hj1 = pref(r2i−1, p) in M then r2i
is not assigned to hj2 = pref(r2i, p) in M . Therefore, in the assignment derived from M ,
x2i−1,p = x2i,p for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ c) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(r2i−1) + 1) (where l(r2i−1) = l(r2i))
and Constraint 14 is satisfied for x.
Assume x does not satisfy Constraint 15. For all i (2c + 1 ≤ i ≤ n1), j (1 ≤ j ≤ n2)
and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(r2i−1)), suppose that (ri, hj) is an acceptable pair not in M where
hj = pref(ri, p) and rank(hj , ri) = q. If cj
l(hj)+1∑
q′=q+1
xi,p′ = 0 then Constraint 15 is trivially
satisfied as
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′)} ≥ 0.
Hence, cj
l(hj)+1∑
q′=q+1
xi,p′ = cj If
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′)} ≥ cj then Constraint 15
is satisfied. Hence
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′)} < cj However, since cj
l(hj)+1∑
q′=q+1
xi,p′ =
cj , ri must be unassigned or have a partner worse than hj . Also, since
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X :
(ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′)} < cj , hj is either under-subscribed or has a partner worse than ri. Thus
(ri, hj) blocks M , a contradiction. Hence, Constraint 15 is satisfied by x.
Assume x does not satisfy Constraint 16. For all x2i,p2 such that i (1 ≤ i ≤ c),
p1, p2 (1 ≤ p1 < p2 ≤ l(r2i−1)) where hj1 = pref(r2i−1, p1), pref(r2i, p1) = pref(r2i, p2) =
hj2 and rank(hj1 , r2i−1) = q. If cj1x2i,p2 = 0 then Constraint 16 is trivially satisfied as
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q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj1 , q′)} ≥ 0. Hence, cj1x2i,p2 = cj1 . If
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X :
(ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj1 , q′)} ≥ cj1 then Constraint 16 is satisfied. Hence,
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′,p′′) ∈
R(hj1 , q
′)} < cj1 .
However, since cj1x2i,p2 = cj1 in x, (r2i−1, r2i) is jointly assigned to a worse partner
than (hj1 , hj2). Further, since
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj1 , q′)} < cj1 in x, hj1 is either
under-subscribed in M or prefers r2i−1 to some member of M(hj1). Thus, (r2i−1, r2i) blocks
M with (hj1 , hj2), a contradiction. Therefore Constraint 16 holds in the assignment derived
from M .
Assume x does not satisfy Constraint 17. Let there be x2i,p2 such that i (1 ≤ i ≤ c) and
p1, p2(1 ≤ p1 < p2 ≤ l(r2i−1)), where hj = pref(r2i−1,p1) = pref(r2i,p1), pref(r2i, p1) =
pref(r2i, p2) = hj and rank(hj , r2i−1) = q. If (cj − 1)x2i,p2 = 0 then Constraint 17 is
trivially satisfied as
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′)} ≥ 0. Hence, (cj −1)x2i,p2 = cj −1.
If
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′)} ≥ cj − 1 then Constraint 17 is satisfied. Hence,
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′)} < cj − 1.
However, since (cj − 1)x2i,p2 = cj − 1 in x, (r2i−1, r2i) is jointly assigned to a worse
partner than (hj , hj). Further, since
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′)} < (cj−1) in x, hj
is either under-subscribed in M or prefers r2i−1 to some assignee in M(hj) other than r2i.
Thus, (r2i−1, r2i) blocks M with (hj , hj), a contradiction. Therefore Constraint 17 holds in
the assignment derived from M .
A similar argument for the odd members of the couples in M ensures that Constraints
18 and 19 are also satisfied in x.
Assume x does not satisfy Constraint 22. There exists i (1 ≤ i ≤ c) and p (1 ≤ p ≤
r2i−1), where hj1 = pref(r2i−1, p), hj2 = pref(r2i, p), hj1 6= hj2 , rank(hj1 , r2i−1) = q1
and rank(hj2 , r2i) = q2, if
l(r2i−1)+1∑
p′=p+1
x2i−1,p′ = 0 then Constraint 22 must be satisfied in x.
Hence,
l(r2i−1)+1∑
p′=p+1
x2i−1,p′ = 1. If αj1,q1 = 0 (similarly αj2,q2 = 0) then Constraint 22 must be
satisfied in x. Hence
l(r2i−1)+1∑
p′=p+1
x2i−1,p′ = 1, αj1,q1 = 1 and αj2,q2 = 1.
Since αj1,q1 = 1,
q1−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj1 , q′)} < cj . Thus hj1 is under-subscribed
in M or prefers r2i−1 to some assignee in M(hj1). Similarly, if αj2,q2 = 1, then hj2 is under-
subscribed in M or prefers r2i to some assignee in M(hj2). Also in M , (r2i−1, r2i) is
unassigned or is assigned to a worse partner than (hj1 , hj2). Thus, (r2i−1, r2i) blocks M
with (hj1 , hj2), a contradiction. Therefore Constraint 22 is satisfied in x, α, β.
Let
γ = cj
l(r2i−1)+1∑
p′=p+1
x2i−1,p′ −
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′)}
(cj − 1)
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Further, let
δ =
l(hj)∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′ , p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′)}
and let
ε =
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′)}
Assume x does not satisfy Constraint 23. Hence, γ > δ. If cj
l(r2i−1)+1∑
p′=p+1
x2i−1,p′ = 0 then
γ ≤ 0. However, δ ≥ 0, a contradiction. Hence cj
l(r2i−1)+1∑
p′=p+1
x2i−1,p′ = cj .
Clearly, 0 ≤ ε ≤ cj . Assume ε = cj . Hence, γ = cj − (cj/cj − 1) = cj(cj − 2)/(cj − 1).
A simple argument shows that cj − 2 < γ < cj − 1. Thus δ ≤ cj − 2. However, this implies
that hj has two free posts in M and (r2i−1, r2i) is unassigned or is assigned to a worse
partner than (hj , hj). Thus, (r2i−1, r2i) blocks M with (hj , hj) , a contradiction. Assume
ε = cj − 1. Hence γ = cj − 1. Thus, δ ≤ cj − 2. However, this again implies that hj has
two vacant posts in M and (r2i−1, r2i) is unassigned or is assigned to a worse partner than
(hj , hj). Thus, (r2i−1, r2i) blocks M with (hj , hj), a contradiction.
Hence, ε < cj − 1 and thus cj − 1 < γ ≤ cj . Therefore, δ ≤ cj − 1. This implies that hj
has a vacant post in M , moreover, hj prefers r2i−1 or r2i to at least one of its assignees and
(r2i−1, r2i) is unassigned or is assigned to a worse partner than (hj , hj). Hence, (r2i−1, r2i)
blocks M with (hj , hj), a contradiction. Therefore Constraint 23 is satisfied in x.
Assume x, α, β does not satisfy Constraint 24. For some i (1 ≤ i ≤ c) and p (1 ≤ p ≤
l(r2i−1)) where pref(r2i−1, p) = pref(r2i, p) = hj , let rmin be the better of r2i and r2i−1
according to hospital hj with rank(hj , rmin) = qmin.
Hence
l(r2i−1)+1∑
p′=p+1
x2i−1,p′ = 1, αj,qmax = 1 and βj,qmin = 1. Since αj,qmax = 1,
qmax−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′)} < cj
Thus hj is under-subscribed in M or prefers r2i−1 to some assignee, rx, in M(hj). Similarly,
if βj,qmin = 1 then
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′)} < cj − 1
Thus hj is under-subscribed in M or prefers r2i to some assignee, ry, in M(hj).
This implies that in M , (r2i−1, r2i) is assigned to a worse partner than (hj , hj), hj
prefers r2i−1 to some rx ∈M(hj) and also prefers r2i to some ry ∈M(hj). Moreover, in M ,
(r2i−1, r2i) is unassigned or is assigned to a worse partner than (hj , hj). Thus, (r2i−1, r2i)
blocks M with (hj , hj), a contradiction. Therefore Constraint 24 is satisfied in x, α, β.
As all of the constraints in J hold for an assignment derived from a stable matching M , a
stable matching M in I represents a feasible solution to J .
Conversely, consider a feasible solution, 〈x〉, to J . From such a solution we form a set
of pairs, M , as follows.
Initially let M = ∅. For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n1) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(ri)) if xi,p = 1 then add
(ri, hj) to M where hj = pref(ri, p). As 〈x〉 satisfies Constraints 9, 12 and 13, each resident
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in M must have exactly one partner or be unassigned (but not both) and each hospital in
M must have at most cj assignees.
As 〈x〉 satisfies Constraint 14 each resident couple (r2i−1, r2i) must be either jointly
assigned to a hospital pair (hj1 , hj2) where pref((r2i−1, r2i, p) = (hj1 , hj2)) for some p (1 ≤
p ≤ l(r2i−1)), meaning that (r2i−1, hj) ∈ M and (r2i, hj2) ∈ M , or jointly unassigned
meaning that both r2i−1 and r2i are unassigned in M .
Therefore the set of pairs M created from the solution 〈 x α β 〉 to J , is a matching in
I. We now show that M is stable.
Type 1 Blocking Pair - Assume (ri, hj) blocks M (as a type 1 blocking pair), where ri is a
single resident. Let pref(ri, p) = hj and rank(hj , ri) = q. Therefore, ri is unassigned or, has
a worse partner than hj and hj is under-subscribed or prefers ri to some member of M(hj).
However, this implies that in J , cj
l(ri)+1∑
p′=p+1
xi,p′ = cj and
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : rank(hj , ri′) = q′ ∧
pref(ri′ , p
′′) = hj)} < cj and therefore Constraint 15 is not satisfied in J , a contradiction.
Therefore no such (ri, hj) can block M .
Type 2 Blocking Pair - Assume (r2i−1, r2i) blocks M (as a type 2 blocking pair) with
(hj1 , hj2) where pref((r2i−1, r2i), p1) = (hj1 , hj2),
pref((r2i−1, r2i), p2) = (M(r2i−1),M(r2i))
for (1 ≤ p1 < p2 ≤ l(r2i−1)), pref(r2i, p1) = pref(r2i, p2) = hj2 and rank(hj1 , r2i−1) = q.
Hence, r2i has the same hospital in positions p1 and p2, and hj1 is under-subscribed or
prefers r2i−1 to some member of M(hj1).
Further assume pref(r2i−1, p1) 6= pref(r2i, p1). Hence cj1x2i,p2 = cj1 and
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj1 , q′)} < cj1
as hj1 is under-subscribed or prefers r2i−1 to some member of M(hj1). Hence in J , the RHS
of Constraint 16 is at most (cj1 − 1) and the LHS is equal to cj1 and therefore Constraint
16 is not satisfied in J , a contradiction. Therefore no such ((r2i−1, r2i), (hj1 , hj2)) can block
M .
Thus, pref(r2i−1, p1) = pref(r2i, p1). Hence (cj1 − 1)x2i,p2 = (cj1 − 1) and
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈
X : q′ 6= rank(hj1 , r2i) ∧ (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj1 , q′) < cj1 − 1) as hj1 is under-subscribed or prefers
r2i−1 to some member of M(hj1) other than r2i. Hence in J , the RHS of Constraint 17 is
at most cj1 − 2 and the LHS is equal to cj1 − 1 and therefore Constraint 17 is not satisfied
in J , a contradiction. Therefore no such ((r2i−1, r2i), (hj1 , hj2)) can block M .
A similar argument can be used to show that the odd member of each couple cannot
improve in such a blocking pair in M and therefore Constraint 18 and 19 are both satisfied
in the assignment derived from M .
Type 3 Blocking Pairs - Suppose that (r2i−1, r2i) blocks M (as a type 3 blocking pair) with
(hj1 , hj2) where rank((r2i−1, r2i), (hj1 , hj2)) = p, rank(hj1 , r2i−1) = q1 and rank(hj2 , r2i) =
q2. Hence, (r2i−1, r2i) is unassigned or prefers (hj1 , hj2) to (M(r2i−1),M(r2i)) where hj1 6=
M(r2i−1) and hj2 6= M(r2i).
Type 3a Blocking Pair - hj1 6= hj2 . Therefore, hj1 is under-subscribed or prefers r2i−1 to
some member of M(hj1) and hj2 is under-subscribed prefers r2i to some member of M(hj2).
However, this implies that both,
q1−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj1 , q′)} < cj1
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and
q2−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj2 , q′)} < cj2
in J . Hence αj1,q1 = 1, αj2,q2 = 1 and
l(r2i−1)+1∑
p′=p+1
x2i−1,p′ = 1
and thus Constraint 22 is not satisfied in J , a contradiction. Therefore no such ((r2i−1, r2i),
(hj1 , hj2)) can block M .
Type 3b Blocking Pair - hj1 = hj2 = hj and hj has two unassigned posts in M .
However, this implies that in J ,
l(hj)∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′ , p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′) ≤ cj − 2
and also
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ : (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′)} ≤ cj − 2
Further,
cj
l(r2i−1)+1∑
p′=p+1
x2i−1,p′ = cj
since r2i−1 and r2i prefer hj to M(r2i−1) and M(r2i) respectively. Hence in J , the RHS of
Constraint 23 is at most cj − 2 and the LHS is greater than cj − 1 and therefore Constraint
23 is not satisfied in J , a contradiction. Therefore no such ((r2i−1, r2i), (hj , hj)) can block
M .
Type 3c Blocking Pair - hj1 = hj2 = hj and hj has a vacant post in M and hj also prefers
r2i−1 or r2i to some other member of M(hj). Let q = min{rank(hj , r2i−1), rank(hj , r2i)}.
However, this implies that in J ,
l(hj)∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′ , p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′) ≤ cj − 1.
Since hj prefers r2i−1 or r2i to some other member of M(hj) and hj also has a free post
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ : (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′) ≤ (cj − 2)
Since (r2i−1, r2i) is unassigned or prefers (hj1 , hj2) to (M(r2i−1),M(r2i)),
cj
l(r2i−1)+1∑
p′=p+1
x2i−1,p′ = cj
Hence,
q−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′)} < cj − 1
Thus in J , the RHS of Constraint 23 is at most cj − 1 and the LHS is greater than
cj − 1 and therefore Constraint 23 is not satisfied in J , a contradiction. Therefore no such
((r2i−1, r2i), (hj , hj)) can block M .
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Type 3d Blocking Pair - hj1 = hj2 = hj , hj is fully subscribed and also has two assignees
rx and ry (where x 6= y and neither x nor y is equal to r2i−1 or r2i) such that hj prefers
r2i−1 to rx and also prefers r2i to ry. Let rmin be the better of r2i and r2i−1 according to
hospital hj with rank(hj , rmin) = qmin. Analogously, let rmax be the worse of r2i and r2i−1
according to hospital hj with rank(hj , rmax) = qmax.
However, this implies that both
qmin−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′)} < cj − 1
and
qmax−1∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′)} < cj
in J . Hence βj,qmin = 1 and αj,qmax = 1. Also
l(r2i−1)+1∑
p′=p+1
x2i−1,p′ = 1
and thus Constraint 24 is not satisfied in J , a contradiction. Therefore no such ((r2i−1, r2i),
(hj1 , hj2)) can block M .
3.3 Creating the IP model for an example hrc instance
Residents
(r1, r2) : (h1, h2) (h2, h1) (h2, h3)
r3 : h1 h3
r4 : h2 h3
r5 : h2 h1
r6 : h1 h2
Hospitals
h1 : 2 : r1 r3 r2 r6 r5
h2 : 2 : r2 r6 r1 r4 r5
h3 : 2 : r4 r3 r2
Figure 14: Example instance of HRC.
Let I be the example instance of hrc shown in Figure 14 where the capacity of each
hospital in I is shown after the first colon, followed by the preference list. We shall consider
the creation of the corresponding IP model J for the example instance I. For each resident
ri ∈ I (1 ≤ i ≤ 6) construct a vector xi consisting of l(ri) + 1 binary variables, xi,p (1 ≤
p ≤ l(ri) + 1), as shown in Figure 15, and apply the constraints as described in Section 3.2.
Thus, we form an IP model J derived from I.
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x1 : 〈 x1,1 x1,2 x1,3 x1,4 〉
x2 : 〈 x2,1 x2,2 x2,3 x2,4 〉
x3 : 〈 x3,1 x3,2 x2,3 〉
x4 : 〈 x4,1 x4,2 x4,3 〉
x5 : 〈 x5,1 x5,2 x5,3 〉
x6 : 〈 x6,1 x6,2 x6,3 〉
Figure 15: Variables created in J from the example instance of hrc shown in Figure 14.
Let xu denote the assignment of values to the variables in the IP model J shown
in Figure 16. We will show that xu is not a feasible solution to the IP model J and
thus, by Theorem 12, does not correspond to a stable matching in I. However, as all
instantiations of Constraints 9 - 14 hold for xu, xu does correspond to a matching in I,
namely Mu = {(r1, h2), (r2, h3), (r3, h1), (r4, h3), (r5, h1), (r6, h2)}. We shall demonstrate
that several constraints in J are violated by xu and that these constraints correspond to
blockings pairs of Mu in I.
x1 : 〈 0 0 1 0 〉
x2 : 〈 0 0 1 0 〉
x3 : 〈 1 0 0 〉
x4 : 〈 0 1 0 〉
x5 : 〈 0 1 0 〉
x6 : 〈 0 1 0 〉
Figure 16: The assignment of values, xu, to the variables in the IP Model J corresponding
to the unstable matching Mu in I, the example instance of hrc.
Inequality 26 represents the instantiation of Constraint 15 in the case that i = 6 and
p = 1. The LHS of Inequality 26 is the product of the capacity of h1 and the values of the
variables that represent r6 being matched to a worse partner than h1 or being unmatched.
The RHS of Inequality 26 is the summation of the values of the variables that indicate
whether h1 is matched to partners it prefers to r6.
c1(x6,2 + x6,3) ≤ x1,1 + x3,1 + x2,2 (26)
The acceptable pair (r6, h1) is a Type 1 blocking pair of Mu in I. In this case the LHS
of Inequality 26 equals 2 and the RHS of Inequality 26 equals 1. Hence Inequality 26 is not
satisfied in xu and thus xu is not a feasible solution to J .
Inequality 27 represents the instantiation of Constraint 18 in the case that p1 = 2,
p2 = 3 and r = 3. In this case the LHS of Inequality 27 is the product of the capacity
of h1 and the value of the variable that represents r1 being matched at position 3 on its
projected preference list (and thus, since no instance of Constraint 14 is violated, (r1, r2)
being jointly matched to the pair in position 3 on its joint projected preference list). The
RHS of Inequality 27 is the summation of the values of variables which indicate whether
h1 is matched to partners it prefers to r2.
c1(x1,3) ≤ x1,1 + x3,1 (27)
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The acceptable pair ((r1, r2), (h2, h1)) is a Type 2 blocking pair of Mu in I. In this case
the LHS of Inequality 27 equals 2 and the RHS of Inequality 27 equals 1. Hence Inequality
27 is not satisfied in xu and thus xu is not a feasible solution to J .
Inequality 28 represents the instantiation of Constraint 22 in the case that i = 1 and
p = 1. In this case the summation on the LHS of Inequality 28 is over the variables
that represent r1 being matched to a worse partner than h1 in position 1 on its projected
preference or unmatched. (Since no instance of Constraint 14 is violated in J these variables
equally represent (r1, r2) being jointly matched to a worse joint partner than (h1, h2) or
being jointly unmatched). Also, α1,1 is a variable constrained to take a value of 1 in the
case that h1 prefers less than c1 residents to r1. Similarly, α2,1 is a variable constrained to
take a value of 1 in the case that h2 prefers less than c2 residents to r1.
(x1,2 + x1,3 + x1,4) + α1,1 + α2,1 ≤ 2 (28)
The acceptable pair ((r1, r2), (h1, h2)) is a Type 3a blocking pair of Mu in I. In this
case the summation on the LHS of Inequality 28 equals 1. Also, since r1 is in first position
on h1’s preference list and thus h1 prefers no other assignees to r1, α1,1 ≥ (1− (0/2)) and
hence α1,1 = 1. Similarly, α2,1 ≥ (1 − (0/2)) since r2 is in first position on h2’s preference
list and hence α2,1 = 1. Thus Inequality 28 is not satisfied in x
u and xu is not a feasible
solution to J .
x1 : 〈 1 0 0 0 〉
x2 : 〈 1 0 0 0 〉
x3 : 〈 1 0 0 〉
x4 : 〈 0 1 0 〉
x5 : 〈 0 0 1 〉
x6 : 〈 0 1 0 〉
Figure 17: The assignment of values, xs, to the variables in the IP model J corresponding
to the stable matching Ms in I, the example instance of hrc.
Let xs denote the assignment of values to the variables in the IP model J shown in
Figure 17. xs is a feasible solution to the IP model J and as such does correspond with a
stable matching in I, namely Ms = {(r1, h1), (r2, h2), (r3, h1), (r4, h3), (r6, h2)}.
Consider a potential blocking pair of Ms. (r5, h2) is an acceptable pair in I and r5 is
unmatched in Ms. Inequality 29 represents the instantiation of Constraint 15 in the case
that i = 5 and p = 1. The LHS of Inequality 29 is the product of the capacity of h2 and the
values of the variables that represent r5 being matched to a worse partner than h2. The
RHS of Inequality 29 is the summation of the values of the variables that indicate whether
h2 is matched to the partners it prefers to r5.
c2(x5,2 + x5,3) ≤ x2,1 + x6,2 + x1,2 + x1,3 + x4,1 (29)
In this case the LHS of Inequality 29 equals 2 since r5 is unmatched and the RHS of
Inequality 29 also equals 2 since h2 has two assignees that it prefers to r5. Hence Inequality
29 is satisfied in xs. A similar consideration of other possible blocking pairs of Ms in I
shows that no constraint is violated by xs and thus xs is a feasible solution of J .
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3.4 An integer programming formulation for hrct
The Hospitals / Residents Problem with Couples and Ties (hrct) is a generalisation of
hrc in which hospitals (respectively residents) may find some subsets of their acceptable
residents (respectively hospitals) equally preferable. Residents (respectively hospitals) that
are found equally preferable by a hospital (respectively resident) are tied with each other
in the preference list of that hospital (respectively resident).
In this section we show how to extend the IP model for hrc as represented in Section
3.2 to the hrct case. In order to do so we require some additional notation.
For an acceptable resident-hospital pair (ri, hj), where ri is a single resident let rank(ri,
hj) = q denote the rank that resident ri assigns hospital hj where 1 ≤ q ≤ l(ri). Thus,
rank(ri, hj) is equal to the number of hospitals that ri prefers to hj plus one.
For an acceptable pair ((rs, rt), (hj , hk)) where c = (rs, rt) is a couple, let rank(c,
(hj , hk)) = q denote the rank that the couple c = (rs, rt) assigns the hospital pair (hj , hk)
where 1 ≤ q ≤ l(c). Thus, rank(c, (hj , hk)) is equal to the number of hospital pairs that
(rs, rt) jointly prefers to (hj , hk) plus one.
For each single resident ri ∈ R and integer p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(ri)) let
p+ = max{p′ : 1 ≤ p′ ≤ l(ri) ∧ rank(ri, pref(ri, p)) = rank(ri, pref(ri, p′))}
Similarly, in the case of a couple c and integer p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(c)) let
p+ = max{p′ : 1 ≤ p′ ≤ l(c) ∧ rank(c, pref(c, p)) = rank(c, pref(c, p′))}
Intuitively, for a single resident ri, p
+ is the largest position on ri’s preference list of a
hospital appearing in the same tie on ri’s list as the hospital in position p on ri’s preference
list. Also, for a couple (ri, rj), p
+ is the largest position on (ri, rj)’s joint preference list of
a hospital pair appearing in the same tie on (ri, rj)’s preference list the as hospital pair in
position p on (ri, rj)’s joint preference list.
To correctly construct an IP of model HRCT we must make the following alterations to
the mechanism described in Section 3.2 for obtaining an IP model from an HRC instance.
All constraints are as before unless otherwise noted. Since, a hospital hj may rank some
members of M(hj) equally with ri in HRCT, the summations involving q in Constraints 15
- 19 and 23 and the Inequalities 20 and 21 must now range from 1 to q.
Also, since a resident ri may rank M(ri) equally with hj , the summations involving p
in Constraints 15, 22, 23 and 24 must now range from p+ + 1 to l(ri) + 1. Further, we must
extend the definition of p1 and p2 in Constraints 16 - 19 such that 1 ≤ p1 ≤ p+1 < p2 ≤ l(rs)
where rs is the resident involved in each case.
To give an example of a modified constraint, a full description of Stability 1 within the
hrct context is:
Stability 1 - In a stable matching M in I, if a single resident ri ∈ R has a partner
worse than some hospital hj ∈ H where pref(ri, p) = hj and rank(hj , ri) = q then hj must
be fully subscribed with partners at least as good as ri. Therefore, either
l(ri)+1∑
p′=p++1
xi,p′ = 0
or hj is fully subscribed with partners at least as good as ri, i.e.
q∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′)} = cj
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Thus, for each i (2c + 1 ≤ i ≤ n1) and p (1 ≤ p ≤ l(ri)) we obtain the following
constraint where pref(ri, p) = hj and rank(hj , ri) = q:
cj
l(ri)+1∑
p′=p++1
xi,p′ ≤
q∑
q′=1
{xi′,p′′ ∈ X : (ri′,p′′) ∈ R(hj , q′)} (30)
The other constraints in the hrct model follow by adapting the remaining stability
criteria in an analogous fashion. Using a proof analogous to that of Theorem 12, the
following result may be established.
Theorem 13. Given an instance I of hr, let J be the corresponding IP model as defined
in Section 3.4. A stable matching in I is exactly equivalent to a feasible solution to J .
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Introduction
We ran experiments on a Java implementation of the IP models as described in Section 3
applied to both randomly-generated and real data. We present data showing (i) the average
time taken to find a maximum cardinality stable matching or report that no stable matching
exists, and (ii) the average size of a maximum cardinality stable matching where a stable
matching did exist. Instances were generated with a skewed preference list distribution
on both sides, taking into account that in practice some residents and hospitals are more
popular than others (on both sides, the most popular agent was approximately 3 times as
popular as the least popular agent).
All experiments were carried out on a desktop PC with an Intel i5-2400 3.1Ghz processor,
with 8Gb of memory running Windows 7. The IP solver used in all cases was CPLEX 12.4
and the model was implemented in Java using CPLEX Concert.
To test our implementation for correctness we used a brute force algorithm which recur-
sively generated all possible matchings admitted by an hrc instance and selected a max-
imum cardinality stable matching from amongst those matchings or reported that none
of the generated matchings was stable. Due to the inefficiency of this algorithm it may
only be realistically applied to relatively small instances. When solving several thousand
hrc instances involving up to 15 residents our implementation agreed with the brute force
algorithm when reporting whether the instance admitted a stable solution and further our
implementation returned a stable matching of the same size as a maximum cardinality
stable matching output by the brute force algorithm.
For all the instances solved in these experiments, the minimum length of preference list
for an individual resident is 5 and the maximum length is 10. In the SFAS application, the
joint preference list for a couple (ri, rj) is derived from the preference lists of the individual
residents ri and rj . The joint preference lists of the couples in the SFAS application are
constructed as follows. For a couple (ri, rj), let s (respectively t) be the length of the
individual preference list of ri (respectively rj). Now, let a and b (1 ≤ a ≤ s, 1 ≤ b ≤ t).
The rank pair (a, b) represents the ath hospital on resident ri’s individual preference list
and the bth hospital on resident rj ’s preference list. Couple (ri, rj) finds acceptable all pairs
(hp, hq) where ri finds hp acceptable and rj finds hq acceptable (st pairs in total). These
pairs are ordered as follows. Let L = max{s, t}. Corresponding to every such acceptable
pair (hp, hq), create an L-tuple whose i
th entry is the number of residents in the couple
who obtain their ith choice (when considering their individual lists) in the pair (hp, hq).
The acceptable pairs on the couple’s list are then ordered according to a lexicographically
increasing order on the reverse of the corresponding L-tuples. The preference lists of the
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Figure 18: Empirical Results in Experiment 1.
couples in the randomly generated instances in the experiments that follow are constructed
in a similar fashion.
4.2 Experiments with randomly generated instances
In the experiments which follow we consider the question of how the time taken to find
maximum cardinality stable matchings or report that no stable matching exists in an in-
stance of hrc alters as we vary the parameters of the instance. Further, we consider how
the size of a maximum cardinality stable matching supported by an instance changes as we
vary the parameters of the instance.
4.2.1 Experiment 1
In this first experiment, we report on data obtained as we increased the number of residents
while maintaining a constant ratio of couples, hospitals and posts to residents. For various
values of x (100 ≤ x ≤ 1000) in increments of 30, 1000 randomly generated instances
were created containing x residents, 0.1x couples and 0.1x hospitals with x available posts
which were unevenly distributed amongst the hospitals. The mean time taken to find a
maximum cardinality stable matching or report that no stable matching existed in each
instance is plotted in Figure 18 for all values of x. Figure 18 also shows charts displaying
the percentage of instances encountered which admit a stable solution and the mean size
of the maximum cardinality stable solution for all values of x.
The data in Figure 18 shows that the mean time taken to find a maximum cardinality
stable matching or report that no stable matching existed increased as we increased the
number of residents in the instance. Figure 18 also shows that the percentage of hrc
instances admitting a stable matching did not appear to be correlated with the number of
residents involved in the instance. Figure 18 also shows that as the number of residents in
the instances increased the mean size of the maximum cardinality stable matching supported
by the instances increased.
4.2.2 Experiment 2
In our second experiment, we report on results obtained as we increased the the percentage
of residents involved in couples while maintaining the same total number of residents,
hospitals and posts. For various values of x (0 ≤ x ≤ 250) in increments of 25, 1000
randomly generated instances were created containing 1000 residents, x couples (and hence
1000−2x single residents) and 100 hospitals with 1000 available posts which were unevenly
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Figure 19: Empirical Results in Experiment 2.
distributed amongst the hospitals. The mean time taken to find a maximum cardinality
stable matching or report that no stable matching existed in each instance is plotted in
Figure 19 for all values of x. In similar fashion to Figure 18, Figure 19 also shows charts
displaying the percentage of instances encountered which admitted a stable matching and
the mean size of the maximum cardinality stable solution for all values of x.
The data in Figure 19 shows that the mean time taken to find a maximum cardinality
stable matching tends to increased as we increased the number of residents in the instances
involved in couples. Further, Figure 19 shows that the percentage of hrc instances that
admitted a stable matching fell as the percentage of the residents in the instances involved
in couples increased. When 50% of the residents in the instance were involved in a couple
we found that 832 of the 1000 instances admitted a stable matching. Figure 19 also shows
that as the percentage of the residents in the instances involved in couples increased the
mean size of a maximum cardinality stable matching supported by the instances tended to
decrease.
We conjecture that, as the number of couples increases while the number of residents
remains the same, the cardinality of the set of stable matchings supported decreases. This
is suggested by the fact that the number of instances where the set of stable matchings is of
cardinality zero increases. Hence this in turn suggests that the range of sizes of the stable
matchings, across the set of all stable matchings admitted, contracts, and thus the size of
the largest matching in that set decreases
4.2.3 Experiment 3
In our third experiment, we report on data obtained as we increased the number of hospitals
in the instance while maintaining the same total number of residents, couples and posts. For
various values of x (25 ≤ x ≤ 500) in increments of 25, 1000 randomly generated instances
of size 1000 were created consisting of 1000 residents in total, x hospitals, 100 couples
(and hence 800 single residents) and 1000 available posts which were unevenly distributed
amongst the hospitals. The time taken to find a maximum cardinality stable matching or
report that no stable matching existed in each instance is plotted in Figure 20 for all values
of x. Again, in similar fashion to Figure 18, Figure 20 also shows charts displaying the
percentage of instances encountered which admitted a stable matching and the mean size
of a maximum cardinality stable solution for all values of x.
Figure 20 shows that the mean time taken to find a maximum cardinality stable match-
ing tended to decrease as we increased the number of hospitals in the instances. We believe
that this is due to the hospitals’ preference lists becoming shorter, thereby reducing the
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Figure 20: Empirical Results in Experiment 3.
model’s complexity. The data in Figure 20 also shows that the percentage of hrc instances
admitting a stable matching appeared to increase with the number of hospitals involved in
the instance. We conjecture that this is because, as each hospital has a smaller number of
posts, it is more likely to become full, and therefore less likely to be involved in a blocking
pair due to being under-subscribed. Finally, the data shows that as the number of hospi-
tals in the instances increased, the mean size of a maximum cardinality stable matching
supported by the instances tended to decrease. This can be explained by the fact that, as
the number of hospitals increases but the residents’ preference list lengths and the total
number of posts remain constant, the number of posts per hospital decreases. Hence the
total number of posts among all hospitals on a resident’s preference list decreases.
4.2.4 Experiment 4
In our last experiment, we report on data obtained as we increased the length of the
individual preference lists for the residents in the instance while maintaining the same total
number of residents, couples, hospitals and posts. For various values of x (3 ≤ x ≤ 12) in
increments of 1, 1000 randomly generated instances of size 1000 were created consisting of
1000 residents in total, 100 hospitals, 100 couples (and hence 800 single residents) and 1000
available posts which were unevenly distributed amongst the hospitals. The time taken
to find a maximum cardinality stable matching or report that no stable matching existed
in each instance is plotted in Figure 21 for all values of x. Again, in similar fashion to
Figure 18, Figure 21 also shows charts displaying the percentage of instances encountered
admitting a stable matching and the mean size of a maximum cardinality stable solution
for all values of x.
Figure 21 shows that the mean time taken to find a maximum cardinality stable match-
ing increased as we increased the length of the individual residents’ preference lists in the
instances. The data in Figure 21 also shows that the percentage of hrc instances admitting
a stable matching did not appear to be correlated with the length of the individual residents’
preference lists in the instances and further that as the length of the individual residents’
preference lists in the instances increased, the mean size of a maximum cardinality stable
matching supported by the instances also tended to increase. The first and third of these
phenomena would seem to be explained by the fact that the underlying graph is simply
becoming more dense.
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Figure 21: Empirical Results in Experiment 4.
4.3 Performance of the model with real world data
In the context of the SFAS matching scheme, hospitals’ preferences were derived from the
residents’ scores, where a junior doctor’s score is derived from their previous academic
performance. If two residents received the same score, they would be tied in a hospital’s
preference list. Thus, the underlying SFAS matching problem may be correctly modelled
by hrct.
Hence, we further extended our implementation in the fashion described in Section 3.4
to find maximum cardinality stable matchings in instances of hrct and were able to find
optimal solutions admitted by the real data obtained from the SFAS application. The
worst case time and space complexity and the number of constraints in the hrc model is
the same as the hr model. The maximum cardinality stable matchings obtained in the
SFAS application for the three years to 2012 are shown in Table 1 alongside the time taken
to find these matchings.
Number of
Residents
Number
of Couples
Number of
Hospitals
Number
of Posts
Max Cardinality
Stable Matching
Time to
Solution
2012 710 17 52 720 681 9.62s
2011 736 12 52 736 688 10.41s
2010 734 20 52 735 681 33.92s
Table 1: Results obtained from the previous 3 years SFAS data.
5 MM-stability and BIS-stability
In Section 5.1 we demonstrate that BIS-stability and MM-stability are not equivalent by
means of a pair of example instances, the first of which admits an MM-stable matching,
but no BIS-stable matching and the second of which admits a BIS-stable matching, but no
MM-stable matching. Then, in Section 5.2 we present a cloning methodology for hrc that
can be used to construct an instance of one-to-one hrc from an instance of many-to-one
hrc such that the MM-stable matchings in the many-to-one instance are in correspondence
to the MM-stable matchings in the one-to-one instance. We prove further that this cloning
method is not applicable under BIS-stability.
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5.1 Distinction between MM-stability and BIS-stability
MM-stability and the BIS-stability are not equivalent. We demonstrate this by means of
the two instances shown in Figure 22 and Figure 23. Consider the instance of HRC shown
in Figure 22 where h has capacity 2. The matching M = {(r3, h)} is BIS-stable, but the
instance admits no MM-stable matching.
Residents
(r1, r2) : (h, h)
r3 : h
Hospitals
h : 2 : r1 r3 r2
Figure 22: An instance of HRC which admits a BIS-stable matching but admits no MM-
stable matching.
Residents
(r1, r2) : (h1, h1)
(r3, r4) : (h1, h1) (h1, h2)
Hospitals
h1 : 2 : r3 r1 r2 r4
h2 : 1 : r4
Figure 23: An instance of HRC which admits an MM-stable matching that but admits no
BIS-stable matching.
Consider the instance of hrc shown in Figure 23 due to Irving [15], where h1 has
capacity 2 and h2 has capacity 1. The instance admits three distinct matchings, namely
M1 = {(r1, h1), (r2, h1)}, M2 = {(r3, h1), (r4, h1)} and M3 = {(r3, h1), (r4, h2)}. M2 is
MM-stable. However, M1 is BIS-blocked by (r3, r4) with (h1, h2), M2 is BIS-blocked by
(r1, r2) with (h1, h1), and M3 is BIS-blocked by (r3, r4) with (h1, h1).
5.2 A hospital cloning method for hrc under MM-stability
For an arbitrary instance I of hr in which the hospitals may have capacity greater than
one, Gusfield and Irving [13] describe a method of constructing a corresponding instance,
I ′ of hr in which all of the hospitals have capacity one, such that a stable matching in I
corresponds to a stable matching in I ′ and vice versa. In this section we describe a method
for producing an instance I ′ of hrc, in which all of the hospitals have capacity one, from
an arbitrary instance I of hrc, in which the hospitals may have capacity greater than one,
such that an MM-stable matching in I corresponds to an MM-stable matching in I ′ and
vice versa. We show that this correspondence breaks down in the case of BIS-stability.
Let I be an instance of hrc with residents R = {r1, r2, . . . , rn1} and hospitals H =
{h1, h2, . . . , hn2}. Without loss of generality, suppose residents r1, r2, . . . , r2c are in couples.
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Again, without loss of generality, suppose that the couples are (r2i−1, r2i) (1 ≤ i ≤ c). Let
the single residents be r2c+1, r2c+2 . . . rn1 .
Suppose each single resident ri ∈ R has a preference list of length l(ri) consisting
of individual hospitals hj ∈ H. Suppose also that the joint preference list of a couple
ci = (r2i−1, r2i) is a list, of length l(ci), of hospital pairs. Assume each hospital hj ∈ H
(1 ≤ j ≤ n2) has a preference list of individual residents ri ∈ R of length l(hj). Let cj
denote the capacity of hospital hj ∈ H (1 ≤ j ≤ n2), the number of available posts it has
to match with residents.
To construct an equivalent instance I ′ of one-to-one hrc from I we create cj clones of
each hospital hj ∈ H, namely hj,1, hj,2 . . . hj,cj , each of unitary capacity and each repre-
senting one of the individual posts in hj . In the preference list of a single resident ri we
replace each incidence of hj with the following sequence of hospitals hj,1, hj,2 . . . hj,cj .
For each couple ci, we replace each (hj1 , hj2) (where j1 6= j2) in (r2i−1, r2i)’s joint
preference list with the following sequence of hospital pairs:
L1 = (hj1,1, hj2,1), (hj1,2, hj2,1) . . . (hj1,cj1 , hj2,1),
(hj1,1, hj2,2), (hj1,2, hj2,2) . . . (hj1,cj1 , hj2,2) . . . (hj1,cj1 , hj2,cj2 )
which contains all of the possible pairings of the individual clones of hj1 and hj2 . Further
in I ′ we replace each (hj , hj) in (r2i−1, r2i)’s joint preference list with the following sequence
of hospital pairs:
L2 = (hj,2, hj,1), (hj,3, hj,1) . . . (hj,cj , hj,1), (hj,1, hj,2), (hj,3, hj,2) . . . (hj,cj , hj,2) . . . (hj,cj−1, hj,cj )
where {(hj,x, hj,y) : x = y} ∩ L2 = ∅. Thus L2 contains all possible pairings of distinct
individual clones of hj . We now show that MM-stable matchings are preserved under this
correspondence.
Lemma 14. I admits an MM-stable matching if and only if I ′ does.
Proof. Let M be an MM-stable matching in I. We construct an MM-stable matching M ′
in I ′ as follows.
Take any hospital hj ∈ H and list its assignees as ri,1, ri,2 . . . ri,tj where tj ≤ cj . Assume
without loss of generality that rank(hj , ri,1) < rank(hj , ri,2) . . . < rank(hj , ri,tj ). For each
k (1 ≤ k ≤ tj) add (ri,k, hj,k) to M ′.
All single residents ri who are assigned to a hospital hj in M are assigned to an ac-
ceptable hospital clone hj,k in M
′, for some k (1 ≤ k ≤ cj). All couples (r2i−1, r2i) jointly
assigned to some (hj1 , hj2) in M are jointly assigned in M
′ to (hj1,k1 , hj2,k2) for some
k1, k2 (1 ≤ k1 ≤ cj1 , 1 ≤ k2 ≤ cj2). Since (hj1 , hj2) is an acceptable pair of hospitals for
(r2i−1, r2i) in M , (hj1,k1 , hj2,k2) must be an acceptable pair of hospital clones for (r2i−1, r2i)
in M ′ (note that if j1 = j2 then k1 6= k2). Therefore M ′ is a matching in I ′.
We now require to prove that M ′ is MM-stable in I ′. Suppose not. Then there is some
MM-blocking pair for M ′ in I ′. Since no preferences are expressed by a couple in I ′ for a
hospital pair (hj,k, hj,k) consisting of two identical clones, only blocking pairs of Types 1, 2
and 3(a) shown in Definition 1 are possible in I ′.
Case (1): A single resident ri and hospital clone hj,k MM-block M
′ in I ′.
Hence, in I ′ resident ri is unassigned or prefers hj,k to M ′(ri) and also hj,k is under-
subscribed or prefers ri to M
′(hj,k). It is either the case that M ′(ri) = hj,l for some
l (1 ≤ l ≤ cj) or M ′(ri) 6= hj,l for all l (1 ≤ l ≤ cj) in I ′.
(i) If M ′(ri) 6= hj,l for all l (1 ≤ l ≤ cj), then, by construction, this would imply that in
M , ri is unassigned or prefers hj to M(ri) and hj is also either under-subscribed or prefers
ri to some member of M(hj), and thus (ri, hj) forms an MM-blocking pair of M in I, a
contradiction.
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(ii) If M ′(ri) = hj,l for some l (1 ≤ l ≤ cj), then ri must prefer hj,k to hj,l and therefore
k < l. So hj,k is assigned in M
′ to some rp such that hj,k prefers rp to ri. Hence (ri, hj,k)
cannot MM-block M ′ in I ′.
Case (2): Resident couple (r2i−1, r2i) MM-blocks M ′ with (hj1,k1 , hj2,k2) in I ′ for some
k1, k2 (1 ≤ k1 ≤ cj1 , 1 ≤ k2 ≤ cj2) where M ′(r2i−1) = hj1,k1 or M ′(r2i) = hj2,k2
In this case either j1 6= j2 or j1 = j2. Consider first the case where j1 6= j2 and
(r2i−1, r2i) prefers (hj1,k1 , hj2,k2) to (hj1,k1 ,M ′(r2i)) and hj1,k1 is either under-subscribed
in M ′ or prefers r2i−1 to M ′(hj1,k1). It is either the case that M ′(r2i−1) = hj1,l for some
l (1 ≤ l ≤ cj1) or M ′(r2i−1) 6= hj1,l for all l (1 ≤ l ≤ cj1).
(i) If M ′(r2i−1) 6= hj1,l for all l (1 ≤ l ≤ cj1) then if hj1,k1 is under-subscribed in M ′,
hj1 must be under-subscribed in M and (r2i−1, r2i) must MM-block M in I with (hj1 , hj2),
a contradiction. Also, if hj1,k1 prefers r2i−1 to M ′(hj1,k1) then hj1 must prefer r2i−1 to
some member of M(hj1) in M . Hence (r2i−1, r2i) must MM-block M with (hj1 , hj2) in I ,
a contradiction.
(ii) If M ′(r2i−1) = hj1,l for some l (1 ≤ l ≤ cj1) then (r2i−1, r2i) jointly prefers
(hj1,k1 , hj2,k2) to (hj1,l, hj2,k2) and therefore k1 < l. So hj1,k1 is matched in M
′ to some
rp such that hj1,k1 prefers rp to r2i−1 and therefore (r2i−1, r2i) cannot MM-block M ′ with
(hj1,k1 , hj2,k2) in I
′, a contradiction.
Now consider the alternate case where j1 = j2 and (r2i−1, r2i) prefers (hj1,k1 , hj1,k2)
where k1 6= k2 to (hj1,k1 ,M ′(r2i)) and hj1,k1 is either under-subscribed in M ′ or prefers
r2i−1 to M ′(hj1,k1). It is either the case that M ′(r2i−1) = hj1,l for some l (1 ≤ l ≤ cj1) or
M ′(r2i−1) 6= hj1,l for all l (1 ≤ l ≤ cj1).
(i) If M ′(r2i−1) 6= hj1,l for all l (1 ≤ l ≤ cj1) then if hj1,k1 is under-subscribed in M ′,
hj1 must be under-subscribed in M and (r2i−1, r2i) must MM-block M in I with (hj1 , hj1),
a contradiction. Further, if hj1,k1 prefers r2i−1 to M ′(hj1,k1) then hj1 must prefer r2i−1 to
some member of M(hj1) other than r2i−1 in M . Hence (r2i−1, r2i) must MM-block M with
(hj1 , hj1) in I , a contradiction.
(ii) If M ′(r2i−1) = hj1,l for some l (1 ≤ l ≤ cj1) then (r2i−1, r2i) jointly prefers
(hj1,k1 , hj1,k2) where k1 6= k2 to (hj1,l, hj1,k2) and therefore k1 < l. So hj1,k1 is assigned in
M ′ to some rp such that hj1,k1 prefers rp to r2i−1 and therefore (r2i−1, r2i) cannot MM-block
M ′ with (hj1,k1 , hj1,k2) in I ′, a contradiction.
A similar argument may be applied when considering the case that (r2i−1, r2i) prefers
(hj1,k1 , hj2,k2) to (M
′(r2i−1), hj2,k2) in I ′.
Case (3a): Resident couple (r2i−1, r2i) MM-blocks M ′ in I ′ in I ′ with (hj1,k1 , hj2,k2) (where
j1 6= j2) for some k1, k2 (1 ≤ k1 ≤ cj1 , 1 ≤ k2 ≤ cj2) where M ′(r2i−1) 6= hj1,k1 and
M ′(r2i) 6= hj2,k2 . Hence, resident couple (r2i−1, r2i) is either jointly unassigned in M ′ or
jointly assigned in M ′ to a worse hospital pair than (hj1,k1 , hj2,k2) (where j1 6= j2) for
some k1, k2 (1 ≤ k1 ≤ cj1 , 1 ≤ k2 ≤ cj2) and also each of hospitals hj1,k1 and hj2,k2 is either
under-subscribed in M ′ or assigned in M ′ to a worse partner than r2i−1 and r2i respectively.
Assume that M ′(r2i−1) 6= hj1,l for all l (1 ≤ l ≤ cj1) and also M ′(r2i) 6= hj2,l for all
l (1 ≤ l ≤ cj2). From the construction, this means that in M , (r2i−1, r2i) is unassigned
or jointly prefers (hj1 , hj2) to M(r2i−1, r2i) and also each of hj1 and hj2 is either under-
subscribed or prefers r2i−1 and r2i respectively to some member of M(hj1) and M(hj2)
respectively. Hence (r2i−1, r2i) MM-blocks M in I with (hj1 , hj2), a contradiction.
Now, assume that M ′(r2i−1) = hj1,l for some l (1 ≤ l ≤ cj). Then (r2i−1, r2i) jointly
prefers (hj1,k1 , hj2,k2) to (hj1,l,M
′(r2i)) and therefore k1 < l. So hj1,k1 is assigned in M ′ to
some rp such that hj1,k1 prefers rp to r2i−1 and therefore (r2i−1, r2i) cannot MM-block M ′ in
I ′ with (hj1,k1 , hj2,k2). A similar argument may be applied in the case that M ′(r2i) = hj2,l
for some l (1 ≤ l ≤ cj2).
We have therefore shown that an MM-stable matching in M corresponds to an MM-
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stable matching in M ′.
Conversely, let M ′ be an MM-stable matching in I ′. We construct an MM-stable match-
ing M in I from M ′ as follows. For all pairs (ri, hj,k) in M ′ such that hj ∈ H and 1 ≤ k ≤ cj ,
add (ri, hj) to M . Since there are at most cj clones of hj in I
′, hj cannot be oversubscribed.
All single residents ri who are assigned in M
′ to a hospital clone hj,k are assigned to an
acceptable hospital hj in M . All couples (r2i−1, r2i) jointly assigned to some (hj1,k1 , hj2,k2)
in M ′ are jointly assigned in M to (hj1 , hj2) (note that possibly j1 = j2). Since (hj1,k1 , hj2,k2)
is an acceptable pair of hospital clones for (r2i−1, r2i) in I ′, (hj1 , hj2) must be an acceptable
pair of hospitals for (r2i−1, r2i) in I. Therefore M is a matching in I.
We now require to prove that M is MM-stable in I. Suppose not. Then there is an
MM-blocking pair of M in I.
Case (1): A single resident ri and hospital hj MM-block M in I. Then resident ri is
unassigned or prefers hj to M(ri) and also hj is under-subscribed or prefers ri to some
rp ∈ M(hj) in M . If hj is under-subscribed in M then some hj,k is under-subscribed in
M ′. Otherwise, if hj prefers ri to some rp ∈ M(hj) then let k (1 ≤ k ≤ cj) be such that
rp = M
′(hj,k) From the construction, this would imply that in I ′, ri is unassigned or prefers
hj,k to M
′(ri) and hj,k is also either under-subscribed or prefers ri to rp = M ′(hj,k), and
thus (ri, hj,k) MM-blocks M
′ in I ′, a contradiction.
Case (2): Resident couple (r2i−1, r2i) MM-blocks M in I with (hj1 , hj2) and either r2i−1 ∈
M(hj1) or r2i ∈ M(hj2) Consider the case that M(r2i) = hj2 . Then (r2i−1, r2i) prefers
(hj1 , hj2) to (M(r2i−1), hj2). Hence, hj1 is either under-subscribed in M or prefers r2i−1 to
some rp ∈ M(hj1) in M . If hj1 is under-subscribed in M then there must be a hospital
clone hj1,k1 for some k1 (1 ≤ k1 ≤ cj1) which is under-subscribed in M ′. Further, since r2i
is assigned to hj2 in M there must be a hospital clone hj2,k2 for some k2 (1 ≤ k2 ≤ cj2)
assigned to r2i in M
′. Therefore, (r2i−1, r2i) must MM-block M ′ in I ′ with (hj1,k1 , hj2,k2),
a contradiction.
Hence hj1 prefers r2i−1 to some rp ∈ M(hj1) in M . Let k1 (1 ≤ k1 ≤ cj1) be such that
(rp, hj1,k1 ∈M ′. Thus hj1,k1 prefers r2i−1 to rp. Also, as before there is some k2 (1 ≤ k1 ≤
cj2) such that (r2i, hj2,k2) ∈M ′. Hence (r2i−1, r2i) MM-blocks M ′ with (hj1,k1 , hj2,k2) in I ′,
a contradiction. A similar argument may be applied in the case that M(r2i−1) = hj1).
Case (3a): Resident couple (r2i−1, r2i) MM-blocks M with (hj1 , hj2) in I (where j1 6= j2).
Then (r2i−1, r2i) is either jointly unassigned or jointly assigned to a worse pair in M than
(hj1 , hj2) and also each of hj1 and hj2 is either under-subscribed or has a worse partner
than r2i−1 and r2i respectively amongst their assignees in M .
If hj1 (respectively hj2) is under-subscribed in M then there must be a hospital clone
hj1,k1 for some k1 (1 ≤ k1 ≤ cj1) (respectively hj2,k2 for some k2 (1 ≤ k2 ≤ cj2)) that is
under-subscribed in M ′. Further, if hj1 (respectively hj2) has amongst its assignees in M
a worse partner than r2i−1 (respectively r2i) then there must be some hj1,k1 (1 ≤ k1 ≤
cj1) (respectively hj2,k2 (1 ≤ k2 ≤ cj1)) that is assigned to a worse partner than r2i−1
(respectively r2i) in M
′.
From the construction, this means that in M ′, (r2i−1, r2i) is either jointly unassigned or
jointly prefers (hj1,k1 , hj2,k2) to M
′(r2i−1, r2i) and also each of hj1,k1 and hj2,k2 is also either
under-subscribed in M ′ or prefers r2i−1 and r2i to M ′(hj1,k1) and M ′(hj2,k2) respectively.
Hence (r2i−1, r2i) MM-blocks M ′ in I ′ with (hj1,k1 , hj2,k2), a contradiction.
Case (3b): Resident couple (r2i−1, r2i) MM-blocks M in I with (hj , hj) and hj has two
free posts. Then (r2i−1, r2i) is either jointly unassigned or jointly assigned in M to a worse
hospital pair than (hj , hj) in M . From the construction this means that in M
′ there are
two hospital clones hj,k1 and hj,k2 for some 1 ≤ k1 ≤ cj , 1 ≤ k2 ≤ cj , k1 6= k2 that are
under-subscribed in M ′. Since (r2i−1, r2i) is jointly matched in M ′ to a worse partner than
(hj,k1 , hj,k2), (r2i−1, r2i) MM-blocks M ′ in I ′ with (hj,k1 , hj,k2), a contradiction.
45
Case (3c): Resident couple (r2i−1, r2i) MM-blocks M in I with (hj , hj) and hj has one free
post and prefers at least one of r2i−1 or r2i to some rp ∈M(hj1). Also (r2i−1, r2i) is either
unassigned or jointly assigned to a worse hospital pair than (hj , hj).
If hj prefers r2i−1 to rp in I then (r2i−1, r2i) MM blocks M ′ with (hj,k2 , hj,k1) in I ′, a
contradiction. Otherwise hj prefers r2i to rp in I so that (r2i−1, r2i) MM-blocks M ′ with
(hj,k1 , hj,k2) in I
′, a contradiction.
Case (3d): Resident couple (r2i−1, r2i) MM-blocks M with (hj , hj) in I where hj is full and
hj prefers r2i−1 to some rp ∈M(hj) and also prefers r2i to some rq ∈M(hj)\{rp}. Then, in
I, (r2i−1, r2i) is either unassigned or jointly assigned to a worse hospital pair than (hj , hj)
Since hj prefers r2i−1 in I to one of its assignees in M there must be a hospital clone
hj,k1 for some k1 (1 ≤ k1 ≤ cj) that is assigned to a worse partner, rp than r2i−1 in M ′.
Further, since hj prefers r2i to some member of M(hj)\{rp} there must be a hospital clone
hj,k2 for some k2 (1 ≤ k2 ≤ cj) assigned to a partner worse than r2i.
From the construction this means that in I ′, there are two distinct hospital clones hj,k1
and hj,k2 such that (r2i−1, r2i) jointly prefers (hj,k1 , hj,k2) to (M ′(hj,k1),M ′(hj,k2)). Also,
hj,k1 prefers r2i−1 to M ′(hj,k1) and hj,k2 prefers r2i to M ′(hj,k2). Hence (r2i−1, r2i) MM-
blocks M ′ in I ′ with (hj,k1 , hj,k2), a contradiction.
Corollary 15. If I ′ admits a BIS-stable matching it need not be the case that I admits a
BIS-stable matching.
Proof. Let I be an instance of hrc as shown in Figure 23. Clearly, the instance admits
no BIS-stable matching. We construct the instance I ′ from I exactly as in Lemma 14 by
creating two distinct hospital clones h1,1 and h1,2 to represent the two posts in h1 and
amending the preference lists of the couples as shown in Figure 24.
The instance I ′ supports the matching M ′ = {(r3, h1,1), (r4, h1,2)} which is BIS-stable.
Since I admits no BIS-stable matching, M ′ clearly has no corresponding BIS-stable match-
ing in I and the cloning method described above breaks down under BIS-stability.
Residents
(r1, r2) : (h1,1, h1,2) (h1,2, h1,1)
(r3, r4) : (h1,1, h1,2) (h1,2, h1,1) (h1,1, h2) (h1,2, h2)
Hospitals
h1,1 : 1 : r3 r1 r2 r4
h1,2 : 1 : r3 r1 r2 r4
h2 : 1 : r4
Figure 24: An instance of HRC that shows that the cloning method breaks down under
BIS-stability.
6 Conclusions
The new NP-completeness results presented in this work suggest that an efficient algorithm
for (2, 2)-hrc is unlikely. However, we conclude that the IP model presented in this paper
performs well when finding a maximum cardinality stable matching in hrc instances that
are similar to those arising in the SFAS application.
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It remains open to investigate the performance of the model as we increase the size of
the instance substantially beyond that of the SFAS application. It would also be of further
interest to investigate other modelling frameworks, for example involving pseudoboolean
solvers or CP strategies.
The IP model for hrc presented here might also be updated to produce maximum
cardinality stable matchings under other stability definitions, most obviously BIS-stability.
It would be of interest to compare an IP model producing exact maximum cardinality BIS-
stable matchings against hrc heuristics such as those compared and contrasted by Biro´ et
al [6].
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